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BARGAINING OR BIOLOGY?
  THE HISTORY AND FUTURE OF PATERNITY LAW AND PARENTAL STATUS
Katharine K. Baker*
Paternity suits make good headlines,1 but they often make bad law.  The headlines are
news, no doubt, because people care as much about the tangential question, who was sleeping
with whom, as they do about the ultimate question, who is the father?  This article will suggest
that whatever the allure of examining peoples’ sex lives, the law should abandon its interest in
determining biological paternity.  The legal rights and duties of fatherhood should emanate from
commitment and contract, not from sex or genes. 
Currently, fatherhood is a status that brings with it rights and obligations.  For the most
part these rights and obligations attach regardless of whether one meets or exercises them.  They
attach, at least according to paternity doctrine, by virtue of one’s blood connection to the child. 
This article challenges that law of parental status at two levels.  First, it demonstrates that often,
notwithstanding paternity doctrine, blood has little to so with one’s status as father. What matters
instead is one’s relationship with the mother.  More specifically contract, or private bargaining
between individuals, often tells us more about who the law will consider a father than does
blood.  Second, this article suggests that thinking about fatherhood as a fixed status is
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problematic.  One’s status as father (or mother) should depend on whether one exercises the
rights and fulfills the obligations of parenthood, not on whether one has a blood connection. 
This second level challenge, to the idea of fixed fatherhood, is a logical outgrowth of the
first challenge, to paternity law, because it is the logical outgrowth of thinking about parenthood
as contract.  If one fails to meet the obligations of a contract to parent, one can lose the rights that
the contract provides.  By the same token, if one promises to perform the obligations of
parenthood, or performs them in a context in which a promise to do so can be inferred, then one
can be bound in contract, not because of one’s status, but because of one’s deliberate acceptance
of fatherhood. 
The argument begins in Section I with a  brief historical and contemporary explication of
the paternity suit.   Section I  then demonstrates just how little the law actually cares about
biological paternity by examining those cases in which the law rejects biology as a basis for
paternity.  The last part of Section I analyzes  potential rationales for holding a biological father
accountable as a father on the basis of biology alone.   None of the rationales that might justify
holding biological fathers automatically responsible for the support of their biological children
can be reconciled with the case law, constitutional doctrine or contemporary mores. 
Section II of the article suggests a different theory of paternity, one that can reconcile
much of the case law, constitutional doctrine and contemporary mores.   It reveals that courts
often root paternal obligation  in contract with the mother, not biology.  This section shows how
contract theory is remarkably consistent with the traditional framework which let marriage define
paternity, appropriately parallels the contractual framework governing most parenthood decisions
in the reproductive technology area, is already operating in many of the equitable cases vesting
obligation in non-biologically related persons, and better reflects the way that fatherhood is
experienced by both parents and children. 
Thus, Section I shows just how little paternity law is actually rooted in genetics. Section
II shows just how much it is rooted in contract.  Section III moves from the descriptive to the
normative in order to explore the theoretical nature of that contract in more detail.  First, it
Bargaining or Biology? 
2
  Th is idea is not new.  Martha Finem an endorsed a m other-focused family that elim inated all
notions of fatherhood almost ten years ago.  See MARTHA F INEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL
FAMILY AND OTHER TW ENTIETH CENTUR Y TRAGEDIES 228-233 (1995).  This article does not go nearly as far. 
It endorses a fam ily structure in which m others ho ld initial rights and obligations, but in which those rights
and obligations are alm ost always shared with fathers.  See infra Section III.  
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examines how contracting for parental rights fits the reliance and will theories of contract, the
consideration theory of contract and relational theories of contract.  Section III then scrutinizes
the entitlements and obligations that are actually exchanged in these contracts.  It suggests and
defends two ideas that are likely to be controversial. First, a gestational mother holds all initial
rights and obligations to a child.2  With some built-in limitations, parental rights and obligations
are the mother’s to contract away as she chooses. Second, the obligation to support a child can be
limited temporally, so that the paternal obligation reflects what was bargained for in the
agreement between mother and father, not a static notion of fatherhood.   Section III concludes
with some examples of how the contract regime would work in practice. 
Section IV explores the relative costs and benefits of embracing this contract model.
Among the benefits is the elimination of the current distinction between how parental status is
determined for parents of children born by virtue of reproductive technology and how parental
status is determined for parents of children born by virtue of sexual intercourse.  Also eliminated
is the distinction between how parental status is assigned to straight and gay parents.  The partner
of a gestational mother (or one who contracts with that mother) acquires parental rights and
obligations by virtue of an agreement with the mother, not by virtue of genetics.  More important,
the proposal offered here recasts fatherhood as a truly volitional status, a set of rights and
obligations that one willingly agrees to. It does so, in part, by severing the  the legal link between
sexual activity and reproduction, as medicine now routinely does, and as is necessary in order to
bring the law of parental status up to date with contemporary mores and the contemporary law of
sexual activity. The proposal also makes clear that if one does not fulfill the obligations of
fatherhood, one can lose the status of father, and if one enjoys the rights of fatherhood, one can
become a father.  
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 See infra notes 169-174 and text accompanying. 
4
 See Social Security Administration, Research Report #65, SSA Publication No. 13-11805, Social
Security Programs Throughout the W orld - 1997 xxvi, xxx-xxxv, xxvi. The Personal Responsibility and
W ork Opportunity and Reconciliation Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. Provides for “Temporary Aid to
Needy Families (TANF)” but those subsidies, as the name so obviously indicates, are temporary and
needs-based.  Most of the rest of the world provides for caretakers, regardless of their class, for the fu ll
term  of a child’s m inority.  
5
 See, for instance, Fineman, supra note 2 at 231-32 (suggesting “[w]e [s]hould face, value and
therefore subsidize caretaking and caretakers.”) and Robin W est, The Right to Care in THEORETICAL
PERSPECTIVE ON DEPENDENCY: CONSEQUENCES FOR W OMEN AND POLITICAL LIFE at 88, 88 (E.Kitay & E.
Feder eds., 2000) (supporting a right to “doulia,” defined as “a right to some measure of state, social or
comm unity support for caregiving labor.”). See also Anne L. Alstott, W ork vs. Freedom: A Liberal
Challenge to Employment Subsidies, 108 Yale L. J. 967, 992-994 (1999) (endorsing cash payments for
single mothers in poverty). 
6
 See Alfred Kahn & Sheila Kammerm an, Introductory Note: Child Support in Europe and Israel, in
CHILD SUPPORT: FROM DEBT COLLECTION TO SOCIAL RESP ON SIBILITY at 45-49 (A. Kahn & S. Kammerman
eds. 1988)
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Among the possible costs of the proposed system is increased direct state expenditure for
children.  The state could no longer demand that the male participant in a heterosexual encounter
be automatically responsible for any biological issue of that encounter.  It is not actually clear
that the proposed system would be more expensive than the current one because most of the men
who are now liable as genetic fathers would be liable as contractual fathers.3 Nonetheless,
without doubt, the system proposed here works best with greater government expenditure on
children.  Mothers will be less vulnerable if the state takes more responsibility for supporting
children.  Today, the United States is the only industrialized country, save China, to not provide
subsidies to the caretakers of children.4  Numerous eminent scholars routinely call for such
subsidies.5  If we embraced the caretaking norm that most of the rest of the world embraces, the
parental status model endorsed here would run little risk of making mothers too vulnerable. 
Alternatively, as is the case in many other countries, biological fathers could be held
accountable for their reproductive activity without necessarily becoming legal fathers.  Numerous
other countries make biological fathers reimburse the state for part of the support of their
biological issue, but what they pay is closer to a fine than a support obligation.6  Such a fine
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 For more on the benefits of this idea, see infra notes and text accompanying 311-314.
8
 Moving towards a parental rights regime rooted in contract is a first step, a step that th is article
endorses. Deciding which particular contract doctrines will be most appropriate in what situations requires
more analysis.  See infra text accompanying notes 209-217.  For instance, the extent to which legislatures
should impose boilerplate terms, the applicability of third party beneficiary analysis and the use of
unconscionability analysis are all questions that are left for another day.  The thesis here is limited to
presenting contract as the appropriate construct through which to conceptualize the origins and obligations
of parenta l status. 
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could deter irresponsible sexual behavior without making fathers out of people who never
intended to be or acted as parents.7  
I offer these ideas in the introduction so as to assuage concerns about the ramifications of
adopting the proposed contract model.  The semi-biological system we have now survives, in
large part, because of fear of what happens to children if we relieve biological fathers of
automatic parental responsibility. Thus, we let an incoherent, outdated and remarkably
inconsistent paternity system govern mostly because we are too scared of what happens if we
abandon it. As a result, we often let men who have enjoyed the benefits of fatherhood escape
parental obligation, we preference blood over nurturing in a way that denies functioning parents
rights, and we force men who never intended to be or acted as fathers, to be fathers.  Both
children and adults deserve a system in which parental status is determined in a fair,
understandable and coherent manner.  Contract provides that system and this article shows how.8  
Before starting, a note on gender is in order. This article uses the terms mother and father
in their biological and social senses, not in the sense to which they refer to the sex of a person
who is parenting.  I do this both for convenience (the parental roles have traditionally been so
gendered that it is much easier to refer to the gendered label than to describe the work being
done) and to underscore what can be important differences in the jobs that parents perform.  Yet
women can father and men can mother. What is important is not the sex of the people performing
the roles, but how adults allocate the rights and responsibilities of parenthood.   This is an article
about how and why the law should construe parental rights as a function of the private bargaining
between the adults who negotiate the rights and obligations of parenthood.   
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 VITEK, D ISPUTED PATE RN ITY PROCEEDINGS § 1.02(3) (5th ed. 1997).
10
 Id.
11
 HARRY D. KRAUSE, ILLEGITIMACY: LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY 109 (1971).
12
  Id. at 22.
13
 VA. CODE ANN. § 20.61.1 (1960).
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I.  The Incoherence of Paternity Law
A. The Origins of Legal Paternity
A biological father’s duty to support his non-marital children originated in England in
1576, as part of the British Poor Laws. Parliament passed a law allowing Justices of the Peace to
seek reimbursement from fathers whose biological children were receiving public assistance.9  
Thus the paternal support duty originated as an attempt to help alleviate the state’s burden for
poor children. Children and unwed mothers of children who were not receiving public assistance
had no right to support from a biological father.   It was not until 1844 that British unwed
mothers, regardless of their welfare status,  acquired the right to sue biological fathers for
support.10   
In this country, the rationale for and implementation of paternity obligations varied
widely.  Several states developed the duty of paternal support in a criminal context, as an incident
of punishment  for bastardy or fornication.11  Other states did not recognize any duty to support. 
As late as 1971, Texas and Idaho refused to impose any support obligation on an unmarried
father.12  Virginia imposed an obligation only on unmarried fathers who voluntarily and formally
acknowledged children as their own.13  Other states acknowledged a duty to support but vested
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 IND. CODE ANN. § 3-625 (1968); S.D. CODIFIED LAW S § 25-8-5 (1969).
15
 Allen v. Hunnicutt, 52 S.E.2d 18 (N.C. 1949).
16
 KRAUS, supra note 11, at 23.
17
  Id. 
18
   Florida, for instance, had a separate statutory scheme for the support of illegitimate children,
setting the m onthly amount of support for illegitimate children under six years old at $40/m o. FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 48-7-4 (1966).
19
  State v. M., 233 A.2d 65, 67 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1967).  
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the right to sue in the mother, not the child.14     In 1949, a North Carolina court explicitly denied
a child’s right to have his paternity investigated.15 
In those states that did recognize a duty to support, the amount of the award was left to
the complete discretion of judges.16  Some states required that judges not take the child’s
illegitimacy into account when setting the support amount,17 but other states mandated it.18  
Given the discretion vested in judges, there was very little to prevent a judge from awarding
whatever amount he felt appropriate. There were no rules or principles guiding the determination. 
 These vagaries are understandable given the mixed motives of traditional paternity law.  As one
New Jersey court summarized:  “Filiation statues are generally considered to represent an
exercise of the police power for the primary purposes of denouncing the misconduct involved,
punishing the offender or shifting the burden of support from society to the child’s natural
parent.”19   The amount of the paternity award and the person entitled to collect it can vary
significantly depending on whether the purpose of the award is to discourage the underlying
sexual conduct, punish the biological father for not marrying the mother, or support a child in
need of resources. 
B. Current Law
In 1984, Congress imposed a degree of uniformity on paternity law.   The Federal Child
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  42 U.S.C.A. § 666(a)(5) (Supp. 1985) 
21
 See for instance, 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/8  (2003). 
22
  Contractual agreem ents limiting child support are subject to judicial scrutiny in order to ensure
that children’s interests are being served.  Thus, m others are usually not allowed to waive all support,
Budnick v. Silverman, 805 So. 2d 1112 (F la. D ist. C t. App. 2002), but they can limit (often substantia lly)
the amount they would otherwise get.   See Lester v. Lester, 736 So. 2d 1257 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)
(mother’s decision to accept extra tuition in lieu of judicial re-adjustment of child support amount binding);
Gerhardt v. Estate of Moore, 441 N.W .2d 734 (W is. 1989) (mother’s lumpsum settlement for child support
binding as against m other, but not against the child). 
23
 Pub. L. No. 94-378, 98 Stat. 1305 (1984).  
24
 45 C.F.R. § 302.56(c) (2003).   The Family Support Act of 1988 requires that the guidelines act
as rebuttable presumptions. Pub. L. 100-485, 42 U.S.C. § 667 (Supp. 1997).
25
 Determining what a child “needs” inevitably requires a baseline determination. If we assume
that public assistance actually meets a child’s basic needs, then a need standard would obligate a
biological father to pay the public assistance amount and no more.  If we assume that public assistance
does not adequately meet most children’s needs, how does one determine what need is? In the spousal
maintenance context, statutory guidelines usually suggest that courts determ ine need with reference to
the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage. E.g. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/504 (2003).  Thus, the need
baseline is based on what the spouse enjoyed before.  For many children subjects of paternity actions,
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Support Act of 1984 required all states to allow children to sue for paternity up until their
eighteenth birthday.20  The child’s right to sue is usually coterminous with the mothers, but the
mother’s right can be limited by statutes of limitations21 and by contractual agreement.22  The
child’s right to sue cannot be so limited.    The Child Support Enforcement Amendments of
198423 required all states to promulgate guidelines pursuant to which courts should award
support.  These guidelines require that “all earning and income of the absent parent” be taken
into account in setting an award and that the award be based on “specific descriptive and numeric
criteria.”24  In reality, what this means is that all states have tables or formulas that set the child
support award as a percentage of income while allowing for a few discretionary variables to
overcome the presumption in favor of the percentage.  In other words, far from the basic poverty
standard which served as the basis for the state’s right to reimbursement in the original paternity
suits, children are now entitled as much to what a father can give them as to what they may
need.25   Indeed, in virtually all states, a child’s entitlement to child support is determined as a
Bargaining or Biology? 
there is no standard from before upon which to base a child support award because they have not lived
with the father who they are suing.
26
  In one fam ous case a biological father claim ed that his paternity obligation should be limited, if
imposed at all, because of the mother’s misrepresentation about birth control.  The court found the
mother’s actions completely irrelevant. The financial content of the child’s right to support was a function
of “the means of the parents” and nothing else.  In re Pamela P. v. Frank S., 449 N.E.2d 713, 715 (N.Y.
1983). 
27
  Kansas ex rel. Herm esmann v. Seyer, 847 P.2d 1273 (Kan. 1993); San Luis Obispo v.
Nathaniel J., 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 843 (C t. App. 1996); Mercer County Dep’t of Soc. Serv. v. Alf M., 589
N.Y.S.2d 288 (Fam. Ct. 1992) (defendant father’s mental disability, by virtue of which he may have a
statutory rape claim , does not excuse his support obligation). 
28
 W allis v. Smith, 22 P.3d 682 (N.M. 2001) (father cannot sue in tort to recover com pensatory
damages stemm ing from girlfriend’s misrepresentation about birth control); Moorman v. W alker, 773 P.2d
887, 889 (W ash. 1989) (“the moral responsibility for creating a human life is not voidable as if sex were a
simple contractual transaction”); Pamela P., 449 N.E.2d at 715 (obligation must be determined without
“consideration of the ‘fault’ or wrongful conduct of one of the parents.”). 
29
  Budnick, 805 So. 2d at 1113. 
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function of the parent’s income, regardless of what kind of relationship that parent has with the
child or with the child’s other parent.26
The child’s entitlement also often attaches regardless of the biological father’s actions or
intent when creating the child.  Many cases suggest that the child’s entitlement to support
emanates from the mere fact of biological connection.  Thus, children who are born as the result
of acts that made their mothers guilty of statutory rape are still entitled to support from their
biological fathers.27    Fathers who were deceived about birth control and had no intent or desire
to bring a child into the world are nonetheless fully responsible for child support and have no
action in tort for their emotional or financial injury.28   In Budnick v. Silverman, a man who
entered into a Preconception Agreement in which the mother agreed not to identify him as the
father in any public way (including on the birth certificate) and not to initiate a paternity action
against him, was nonetheless responsible for child support when the woman did file a paternity
action because “the rights of support and meaningful relationship belong to the child, not the
parent; therefore neither parent can bargain away those rights.”29   Thus, much paternity law
seems to be based on a strict liability theory for genetic contribution.  One is responsible for
Bargaining or Biology? 
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 Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 768 (1982).
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one’s genetic offspring no matter what the circumstances of  that offspring’s creation.  This kind
of strict liability regime makes sense if the right to support is the child’s right and if the child is
vested with that right by virtue of the biological connection per se. 
The problem with this theory is that there are many, many instances in which biological
connection alone does not render a man responsible for the support of his offspring. One can
group the instances in which the state routinely ignores any right a child may have to support
from a biological parent into four categories: (i) the voluntary and involuntary termination of
parental rights, (ii) artificial insemination cases, i.e. fertilization that did not result from sexual
intercourse, (iii) cases in which the law presumes, declares or finds paternal obligation in the
absence of any evidence that the man obligated actually is biologically related to the child, and
(iv) cases in which the law holds a man responsible as a father because he has been acting as a
father, notwithstanding the knowledge that he is not biologically related. 
C.  Rejecting Biology
1. Legal Termination of Parental Rights
 The state may divest someone of parental status if it finds, by clear and convincing
evidence, that the person is unfit to parent.30  In such a case, the parent loses all rights and
obligations to the child and the child has no claim to the adult’s purse.  However, a parent cannot
necessarily relinquish his parental rights and obligations even if that parent claims that he is or
would be an abusive and neglectful parent.  A parent who wishes to voluntarily divest him or
herself of all parental rights and obligations may do so only if the other parent of the child also
wishes that he relinquish his rights and if there is another person ready to adopt the child.   Some
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 Arkansas processes privately filed termination petitions only in adoption proceedings.  ARK.
CODE ANN. § 9-9-220 (Michie 1993).  The state may file a term ination petition only when it is “attem pting to
clear a juvenile for permanent placement.”  ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-341 (Michie 1993).  Delaware prohibits
termination of one parent’s rights unless there is a contemplated adoption unless “continuation of the
rights to be terminated will be harmful to the child.”  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1103(b) (1993). 
32
 444 N.W.2d 415 (W is. Ct. App. 1989).
33
 Id. at 419.    See also In re D.P.C., 375 N.W .2d 221 (W is. Ct. App. 1985). One California court,
which has not been cited or followed by any other court, cam e out differently, In re Joshua M., 274 Cal.
Rptr. 222 (Ct. App. 1990). 
34
  One might argue that the state takes the child’s interest into account by using a Best Interest of
the Child standard in evaluating all term ination and adoption decisions.  In practice, however, adoptions in
which there is a willing non-biological parent and a biologica l parent who wants to relinquish his rights
seem to be approved perfunctorily.  At least 42% of all adoptions are step-parent adoptions.  Victor
Eugene Flango & Carol R. Flango, How Many Children W ere Adopted in 1992, 74 CHILD W ELFARE 1018,
1027 (1995). 
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states make this clear by statute.31  Others rely on case law.  In In re A.B.,32 both mother and
father agreed that it would be better for the child if the biological father’s legal status was
severed so that he could not come between the mother and the child.   The Wisconsin court
refused the severance because “[p]arental rights may not be terminated merely to advance the
parents’ convenience and interests, either emotional or financial.”33   This means that blood
automatically vests an unwilling man with parental obligation only as long as the state wants to
keep the man obligated.   In most cases, the state takes its clues from the mother.  If she wants to
continue to keep the biological father liable for support, the state will not relieve the biological
father of his parental obligation.  If she is willing to sever the biological ties and have someone
else assume responsibility, the state will allow severance.  Not only might this seem somewhat
arbitrary from the obligor’s perspective, the child, in whom the support right is vested, has no
say.34  A child who might want to continue to receive whatever support he or she could get from
a biological father will not be heard if there is another man willing to support.  What this
suggests is that  though a child may have some kind of right to be supported, he or she does not
have a right to be supported by a biological parent per se. 
Bargaining or Biology? 
35
 Most states also have statutory provisions automatically vesting paternal rights and obligations
in a husband who consents to his wife being artificially inseminated by a licensed profess ional.    See, 
e.g., CAL IF. FAM . CODE § 7613 (2003).
36
 See Lori Andrews, Legal Aspects of Assisted Reproduction, 54 ANNALS OF N.Y. ACAD . SCI. 688,
674 (1988).  
37
  See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993); McDonald v. McDonald, 608 N.Y.S.2d 477
(App. Div. 1994); Lori Andrews, Legal and Ethical Aspect of New Reproductive Technologies, 29 CLIN .
OBSTET. &  GYN. 190 (1986) (arguing the preconception intent should govern in cases of artificial
insem ination ); John Lawrence Hill, What Does it Mean to be a Parent? The Claims of Biology as the
Basis for Parental Rights, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 418 (1991) (“the intended parents should be considered
the ‘parents ’ of the child born of [reproductive technologies]”); Marjorie Shultz, Reproductive Technology
and Intent-Based Parenthood: An Opportunity for Gender Neutra lity, 1990 W IS. L. REV. 297, 302 (“legal
rules governing modern procreative arrangements and parental status should recognize the importance
and legitimacy of individual . . . intentions”).   But see, Marsha Garrison, Law Making for Baby Making: An
Interpretive Approach to the Determination of Legal Parentage, 113 HARV. L. REV. 835 (2000) (arguing that
parental determinations in cases of reproductive technologies should be governed by existing family law
rules, many of which do not honor intent). 
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2. Reproductive Technology and Fatherhood
The second category of cases in which biology alone does not control a man’s obligation
involves artificial insemination.   Most states have statutes divesting a man who voluntarily sells
or donates his sperm of all parental rights and obligations, as long as the insemination using his
sperm is performed by a licensed medical professional.35    For cases in which amateurs succeed
in artificial insemination without the aid of a professional  “the preconception intent of the
parties governs who are the legal parents after the child is born.”36   Thus, a man may knowingly
assist in the creation of a child, but if his preconception intent is that he not assume responsibility
for the child, he is not responsible, as long as the child is conceived by means other than sexual
intercourse.  
The preconception intent standard is widely endorsed by commentators and courts alike
as the appropriate one to decide disputed parental rights issues stemming from reproductive
technologies that allow us to conceive without intercourse and separate genetic contributions
from gestational ones.37  It is completely inconsistent with the a strict liability regime based on
the child’s right to support from a biological parent, however.  Budnick  v. Silverman, the
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  Budnick v. Silverman, 805 S.2d 1112, 1114 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
39
  FLA. STAT. ch. 742.14 (2001).
40
  The exception to this is simple insem ination of a woman who wishes to bear a child herself. 
This is relatively inexpensive and increasingly popular among unmarried women.  If there is no husband
who, by statute, becomes the father of the artificially inseminated baby, the responsibility for supporting
the child falls solely on the woman.  See, e.g., the discussion of CAL. C IV. CODE § 7005(b) in Jhordan C. v.
Mary K., 179 Cal. App. 3d 386, 392 (Ct. App. 1986). “[T]he California Legislature has afforded unmarried
as well as married women a statutory vehicle for obtaining semen for artificial insemination without fear
that the donor may claim paternity . . .”That child becomes the modern equivalent of fillius nullius. See
infra text accom panying notes 87-91. 
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preconception contract case mentioned above, illustrates this anomaly perfectly.   Mr. Silverman
claimed that the preconception contract in which the mother agreed not to name him or legally
pursue him as the father made him nothing other than a sperm donor, albeit one that donated the
“old-fashioned way.”38  He argued that he had no obligation because the Florida statute relieved
sperm donors of parental rights and responsibilities.39   The court held that the Florida sperm
donor statute did not apply to conceptions that happen the “old-fashioned way.”   In other words,
a preconception contract is determinative if the conception happens in a “new-fangled” way, but
irrelevant if the conception happens by means of intercourse.  Again, we see arbitrary
enforcement of a child’s right to support from a biological parent, but some assurance that the
child will be supported.  Most reproductive technologies are expensive.  Most of the people using
them with the intent of becoming parents have the ability and desire to support a child.40  Vesting
parental rights in those who spend money with the intent to support a child helps ensure that the
child will be supported. 
3. Legal Non-Biological Fathers 
The third category of cases in which the biological father is not held responsible for the
support of his child involves the law, by presumption or declaration, making someone else the
father.  The most common example of this is the common law presumption that the husband of a
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woman who gives birth to a child is the father of the child.41   For many years,  Lord Mansfield’s
Rule prohibited either spouse from giving testimony that would cast the legitimacy of a marital
child in doubt,42 and a putative father did not have standing to challenge the paternity of a
husband.43  Thus, for most intents and purposes, the marital presumption of the husband’s
paternity was irrebutable. 
The extent to which the modern marital presumption can be rebutted varies from state to
state.44  In most states, the husband, the wife and the putative biological father have the
opportunity to rebut, but that opportunity is temporally limited.  A husband who has cause to be
aware that a child might not be related to him biologically, but who fails to question biological
paternity once he has reason to can be held responsible for child support.45   Comparably, a man
who knew that he was the likely biological father, but failed to bring an action in time, can be
barred from claiming any parental rights he might want to establish.46 As a matter of
constitutional law, the Supreme Court has said that a putative father has no constitutional right to
establish his paternity even if he has a relationship with the child, as long as the mother is
married to someone else and wishes to stay married to that someone else.47   By the same token, a
mother who wishes to bar a biological father from asserting paternity on the basis of the marital
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presumption is free to do so only if her marriage is still intact.48   If she is separated or having
difficulty with the man presumed to be the father of the child, the biological father may have
standing to sue.  A judge evaluates the state of the marriage.49  Thus, the biological father’s rights
and obligations are dependent on what a judge thinks of the strength of a marriage that the
biological father has nothing to do with.  No one has an obligation to tell the child any of the
facts that might be relevant to the child’s right to support from his or her biological parent.  Not
only does this make it highly unlikely that a child will pursue his right to support from a
biological parent,  it makes it highly unlikely that the child will learn the biological facts. 
Preferencing stability over information in this way may make it more likely that the child will be
adequately supported, however.   Men who live with children are likely to help pay for them,
regardless of whether those men are biologically related to the child.50  Vesting paternity in the
man living with the child may help ensure support. 
The marital presumption is not the only presumption that vests paternal rights.  Most
paternity statutes also presumptively name the man listed on the child’s birth certificate51 and/or a
man who “receives the child into his home and openly holds out the child as his natural child” as
the father.52  In cases in which two of these presumption clash or where one of the presumptions
clashes with biological evidence, courts often resolve the issue with reference to a Best Interest
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of the Child analysis, not by virtue of a blood test.53   It is not uncommon for courts to simply
refuse to order blood tests in a case of clashing presumptions.54  The courts do not want to know
the biological answer.   Thus, a biological father’s responsibility may depend on whether a judge
thinks that someone else, albeit someone by law presumed to the be the father, is a better father. 
Again, the child does not appear to have a right to support from a biological father, so much as he
or she has a right to support from someone in addition to a mother. 
The Final Judgement Rule also effectively holds non-biologically related men responsible
for children whom they can prove are not their own.  Once a child support or paternity order is
entered, it is very difficult to re-open it, even with definitive biological evidence.55  Many times,
courts simply refuse to order the blood tests that would make the biological evidence
compelling.56   Contemporary judicial refusals to order blood tests parallel the historic refusals to
admit testimony about “access”57 and they strongly suggest that the law treats paternity as a social
construction not a biological fact.   The proposed Uniform Parentage Act limits anyone who has
formally acknowledged paternity to two years within which he can try to rescind that
acknowledgment, and then only on the basis of fraud, duress or material mistake of fact.58  Once
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again, stability trumps information, but the child’s right to support from someone in addition to
the mother is protected. 
4. Functional Non-Biological Fathers
Finally, some courts hold a man responsible for child support because the mother and
child have come to rely on that support.  Originally, courts debated this issue in the context of
step-parents.59  Some step-parents who had provided support were not be allowed to withhold it
after divorce if the child and mother had come to rely on that support.60  Other courts, worried
about the incentive such rulings could have on potential sources of support, did not hold step-
parents responsible even if the mother and child had relied.61  Today, genetic testing has greatly
expanded the class of cases in which reliance arguments are made.  Because it is now possible to
positively exclude as biologically related men who have acted as fathers, many cases now
involve attempts by men who previously thought they were the father to absolve themselves of
support obligations when they learn definitively that they are not biologically related.  In these
cases, some courts look to whether the functional father took affirmative steps to prevent locating
the biological father.62   Others simply require a finding that the child or mother relied on the de
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facto parent.63  Technically, these courts estop men from denying responsibility for a child
because allowing them to do so would hurt the child.  Often, these men have been deceived into
thinking that they were the father, but they are still found responsible if the child relied on the
mistaken fact of fatherhood.64    In this class of cases, knowledge of, availability of and the
liquidity of the biological father can be crucial.  If the biological father can be found and is able
to support, courts often absolve the functional father of any obligation.65   If the biological father
is unknown or unavailable or broke, the functional father will be ordered to pay. Thus, the
functional father’s obligation is dependent on the availability and financial condition of a man
whom he has nothing to do with and may well have never met.   Courts determine paternity in a
manner that protects a child’s right to be supported, but not the right to be supported by a
biological parent. 
D. Rationale for Paternity Law
The above analysis suggests that far from reifying a child’s right to support from a
biological parent, what paternity doctrine endorses is a child’s right to support from two parents. 
Paternity law is about biparenting as much as it is about biology.   The rationale for such a
regime might be articulated this way: A child is best off with two parents, if no other man fills
the role, the biologically connected man should. There are several problems with this rationale. 
First, it finds minimal support in history.  As mentioned, the original justification for paternity
law was rooted in the state’s fiscal needs.  The state may have hoped that the legal obligation to
support would force a marriage (and thereby secure two parents), but the legal obligation itself
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did not create a father.66    Biologically-related men owed support but they could not petition for
custody or visitation.67  It has only been recently that unwed fathers who were adjudged
responsible could claim any paternal rights.68   Traditionally, a paternity suit did not give a child a
parent, it gave her a paycheck. 
Things are different today.   Men adjudged to be fathers have parental rights that they can
exercise so it is generally more accurate to view the paternity suit as giving a child a parent in
addition to a paycheck.  Still, it gives a child an unwilling parent and it is quite unclear why that
is fair to the unwilling parent or good for the child.  There are three possible answers.  First,
holding an unwilling man responsible is appropriate punishment for the underlying conduct. 
Second, children have a moral claim to their biological father’s resources.  Third, the unwilling
man assumed the risk of pregnancy and can therefore be held responsible.  The first of these
theories is father-driven. The second of these theories is child-driven.69   The third idea,
assumption of risk, collapses into the first two.  
1. Punishment of the Father
Unquestionably, the punishment rationale was very much at the core of early paternity
doctrine.  As the New Jersey court said in 1967, “filiation statutes . . . denounc[e] the misconduct
involved [and] punish the offender.”70  Various feminist scholars still defend paternity doctrine
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because they see it as necessary to curb irresponsible male sexual behavior.71    Paternity doctrine
also punishes men who cannot be considered irresponsible however. It makes male victims of
statutory rape responsible for child support72 and it carries no exception for male victims of
deceit and fraud.  More basically, it punishes men for activity that enjoys considerable
constitutional protection.73  The most recent Supreme Court decision on the subject leaves little
doubt that there is some constitutionally protected right to sex,74 though that right is probably
limited to non-procreative sex.75  Nonetheless, given the special status of non-procreative sex,  it
seems quite odd to punish people who, without any intent to do so, engage in procreative not
non-procreative sex.   Admittedly, men can and almost certainly should use their own form of 
birth control more often than they do if they do not wish to be fathers, but birth control does fail
and couples routinely rely on a woman’s representation as to her own use of birth control. 
Condoms cannot completely solve the problem of unwanted fatherhood any more than birth
control pills and diaphragms can solve the problem of unwanted motherhood.   To the extent that
paternity doctrine is still rooted in punishment, we punish men who, in many instances, have
done nothing wrong. 
2. Entitlement of the Child 
The other rationale for holding unwilling men responsible as fathers, that children have a
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moral claim to their fathers resources, may have more weight.  Judges and commentators talk in
terms of the child’s “natural” right to his father’s resources.76   Causation, not punishment, seems
to underlie this rationale.  “But for” the father’s sexual activity, the child would not have been
born. Therefore the child has a right to the father’s financial support.   The problem with this
formulation is that given the constitutional treatment of reproductive decision-making, the
mother is the far better proximate cause of the child’s existence.  She has significantly more
control over the decision to become a parent.   If part of what the constitution protects is the right
of  “the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into
matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to . . . beget a child,”77 the
constitution protects women better than men.  Once the child is conceived, a man has no right to
terminate the pregnancy78 and the law will hold him accountable as father even if he had no past
and has no present intent or desire to parent.  He cannot relinquish parental status unless the
mother and the state are willing to let him relinquish that status.79  
This disparate treatment of men and women may be justified. The significant emotional
and physical burdens of pregnancy80 make any decision to beget a child necessarily much more
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arduous for women than men.  Thus, it is much more important that a woman be free from state
interference into the decision to beget a child because the process of begetting is so much more
difficult for her.  Moreover, as several scholars have argued and as many more have observed,
mothering and fathering, at least as constructed and lived in this society, are usually very
different tasks.    Mothering a child who has already been born is much more emotionally and
physically taxing than fathering that child.81 Given the financial tradeoffs that women routinely
make when they mother, it is also more expensive than fathering.82   As the Supreme Court has
repeatedly found,83 men and women are often not similarly situated with regard to parenthood.  
The fact that most fathers are not mothers, does not necessarily justify making unwilling
men fathers, however.   The truth  is we force fatherhood on men in a way we do not force
motherhood on women and we do that in the name of protecting a child’s right to support from
biological parents even though the law routinely ignores, obfuscates or simply rejects biology as
the basis for parenthood.  As we saw in Section IC, the law does not protect a child’s right to
support from a biological parent, though it may protect a right to support from some one in
addition to the mother.  Why should the child have a moral entitlement to support from a
biological parent only sometimes? 
3. Assumption of Risk
Perhaps the answer lies in an assumption of risk. When engaging in sexual intercourse,
men assume the risk that a court will not find someone better suited to be the father of any
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potential child.  Perhaps regardless of  whether they have done anything wrong by engaging in
intercourse, and regardless of how much more say a woman has in bringing the child into the
world, men should still share some of the risk of unwanted pregnancies.    Forcing men to assume
this risk would help deter them from engaging in irresponsible sexual behavior and would honor
whatever duty flows from blood connection.   
Accepting the legitimacy of either of these assumption of risk arguments, which are
essentially deterrence and moral obligation arguments, hardly requires endorsing paternity
doctrine, however.  First, if the concern is deterrence, why do we choose to deter with paternal
status?   The involuntary imposition of the status of fatherhood on unwilling men  says
something rather disturbing about our notion of fatherhood.  When we use paternal status as a
deterrent, we imbue that status with a negativity that diminishes those men who fulfill the role
willingly and honorably and lovingly.  It is odd that we “deter” the reckless philanderer by
imposing on him the same obligation we impose on a man who purposefully helps bring a child
into the world and willingly nurtures that child.  We impoverish children’s and adults’ 
understanding of fatherhood when we make it about resources and only resources.84 
Second, if the concern is moral obligation to blood dependents, one must ask why we
treat the moral obligation to young dependents so vastly differently than the moral obligation to
old dependents. The Social Security system in this country makes the dependency of the elderly a
social concern. The young and able-bodied pay money into an entitlement program for the
elderly.85   In contrast, paternity doctrine and the state’s remarkably stingy support of children
make children’s dependency a private concern.  It is hard to see why an adult’s  moral obligation
to a child he never wanted or intended to have is greater than his moral obligation to parents who
probably wanted and almost certainly sacrificed for him.  The obsession the law seems to have
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with protecting a child’s “right” to support from someone in addition to the mother,86 helps keep
children’s dependency private, but why?  We collectivize our moral responsibility for the elderly,
why do we refuse to do the same for the young? 87
Third, it is not at all clear that enforced fatherhood in these circumstances is good for the
child even if it does provide the child with some resources.88  The harm that comes to the child
from the animosity between parents can easily outweigh whatever benefit more resources bring.89
In all likelihood, the child would be better off with resources emanating directly from the state
rather than from a reluctant father who is not likely to pay very much90 or very consistently91 and
is unlikely to assume a meaningful role as father.92   If our concern is children why we do we
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assume that children will be better off with unwilling and resistant fathers? 
The inability to answer these questions convincingly suggests that none of the rationales
for biological paternity doctrine survive scrutiny.  If the current doctrine is rooted, as the
traditional doctrine was, in relieving the state of the burden to support, only those biological
fathers of children receiving public assistance should be liable.  If the current doctrine is rooted
in punishment, we should not hold male victims of rape and deceit liable, and we are left having
to explain why behavior that the state has no business regulating becomes behavior that the state
can punish merely because of the (common) failure of a birth control method.  We also must ask
whether the punishment of fatherhood fits the crime of procreative sex, and, more fundamentally,
whether we want fatherhood to be considered a punishment.  If the doctrine is rooted in the
child’s needs, then what the father owes should be a function of other resources available to the
child.  A child-centered approach would make both the award and the determination of obligation
a function of the child’s needs, not the father’s ability.  If the current doctrine is rooted in the
child’s moral entitlement to support from his or her biological father, one cannot explain the
myriad of presumptions that preclude the child from suing and often from even finding her
biological father and one must confront the fact that we force this moral obligation on men in a
way that we do not force it on women.  We also must ask why we make the parent-to-child
obligation to support private, while we make the child-to-parent obligation to support public and
whether the child is actually better off with an unwilling father. 
The next section explores an alternative theory that does a better job of explaining legal
fatherhood.  It suggests that a man’s explicit or implicit agreement with a child’s mother provides
a more comprehensive framework for understanding paternity. 
  
II.  Contracting for Paternity 
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Perhaps surprisingly, the law is remarkably comfortable letting contract confer parental
status. Indeed, to the extent that the marital presumption used to reign supreme, contract as a
basis for paternity has more historical support than does biology.93  The law of legitimacy (which
lets the marital contract determine paternal relationships)  predates the law of paternity by at least
a thousand years.94  Today, it is contract that currently governs the law of paternity in almost all
cases involving non-traditional means of conception and it is increasingly contract that governs
the law of paternity in most cases involving men who have acted like fathers toward a child.  
This section explores the reliance on contract in more detail.
A. The Marital Presumption as Contract
For most of western history, marriage, not blood, determined fatherhood.  Evolutionary
biologists may tell us that genes determine fatherhood,95 but the law has always told us
something else.  For the Romans and the pre-sixteenth century British, many children simply had
no fathers.  A child born out of wedlock was filius nulius, or child of nobody.96   As mentioned
earlier, a child born in wedlock was the child of the husband unless evidence showed that the
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husband had no “access” to his wife97 but neither husband or wife could testify to non-access.98   
Moreover, a child born two weeks into a marriage, was just as legitimate as the one born 40
weeks into the marriage.  Although there were disturbing racial exceptions to the marital
presumption and some men might have been able to establish illegitimacy of a marital child if
they wanted to,99 the law was indisputably comfortable with letting marriage determine paternity. 
A man became a father by marrying, and only by marrying, a woman. 
There may have been both stability and practicality reasons for letting marriage be the
arbiter of paternity. Asking biological questions, the answers to which can disrupt families, crush
existing relationships, and reveal disquieting truths about the reality of sexual behavior may do
more harm than good.100  Moreover, historically, it was often impossible to get an accurate
answer to paternity questions. Before genetic testing,101 proving paternity was even harder than
proving other notoriously difficult to prove sexual acts, like adultery or rape.  With paternity, the
question is not just whether a sexual act took place, but whether the particular sexual act was the
one that led to the birth of a child.  With no real way to ascertain a reliable answer, there was
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little point in asking the question. 
Marriage was the arbiter because the law needed some arbiter; biological questions were
too messy. One might ask why the law needed an arbiter at all though.  Why insist that certain
children have legal fathers when children of unmarried mothers did not?  The answer seems to be
in part to protect (at least some) children and in part to respect the institution of marriage.  In his
Commentaries, Blackstone writes that these two goals were actually one.    “[T]he main end and
design of marriage . . . [is] . . . to ascertain and fix upon some certain person to whom the care,
the protection, the maintenance and the education of the children should belong. . . .”102  This
view suggests that at its core, the agreement to marry was about children as much if not more
than it was about husband and wife.  The state supported marriage because it was through
marriage that children got support.    If the “main end and design” of the agreement to marry was
to support children, then sub-agreements or assumptions about fidelity needed not trump the
primary obligation to support children.
An early British court deciding an awkward legitimacy case in 1304 placed the sanctity of
marriage, not children, at the core of the marital presumption.   The court would not question the
paternity of a child born to a woman whose husband had been abroad for three years because 
“the privity between a man and his wife cannot be known.”103  In other words, the law treated the
decision to marry as primary.  It was not the law’s place to interfere with the unit created by
marriage, regardless of what transpired during the marriage.  
In Goodright v. Moss, 104 Lord Mansfield seemed to echo this view, though he also
emphasized the collateral benefit of supporting children. The bar to husband and wife testifying
about access was “a rule founded in decency, morality and policy, that they shall not be permitted
to say after marriage, that they have had no connection, and therefore that the offspring is
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spurious.”  Lord Mansfield, like the court in 1304, argues that marriage links two people together
and the law has no place weakening that link.   Marriage is a contract to be together and
regardless of whether the wife was also “together” with someone else, she is still in a unit with
the husband.  
To be sure, honoring contract was not the only reason for preferencing marriage over
blood.  Using marriage not blood also helped ensure the orderly distribution of property. Indeed,
one might reject Blackstone’s view that marriage was an institution designed primarily to protect
children and instead argue that marriage was an institution designed primarily to facilitate the
orderly distribution of property. It is far easier for a probate court to identify the children of an
intestate’s marriage than all the children whom the intestate may have begotten.  Moreover, given
marriages’ ability to regulate women’s sexual behavior, marriage was a way of helping steer a
man’s property to his biological issue.  As long as wives were not allowed to engage in sexual
relations with anyone other than their husbands, husbands could fairly safely assume that
children of the marriage were “their” children.   The problem, of course, is that infidelity is as old
as the institution of marriage.105  The marital presumption of paternity and the evidentiary rules
about testifying to access were  necessary because everyone has always acknowledged that
marriage is an imperfect protector of biological inheritance lines.  
A full historical discussion of the reasons for the elevation of marriage over blood is
beyond the scope of this article.  What is clear, though, is that by preferencing marriage, the law
was preferencing a kind of contract.  Of course, “marriage... is something more than a mere
contract”106 and I do not mean to suggest that contract doctrine can or should be used to govern
all aspects of the marital relationship.  The law has never done so and there are sound reasons for
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it continuing to adopt contract principles reluctantly.107   The inescapable fact though, is that the
joint decision to enter into a marriage looks more like contract than anything else.108  It may be a
contract to enter into a status,109 but the agreement to enter that status must be a mutual one that
involves rights and duties for both parties.110  Traditionally, by agreeing to enter into that status,
husband and wife were agreeing to support and raise any children born to the marriage.  Because
husband and wife agreed to raise children, they were bound to be father and mother,  regardless
of whether the children born to the marriage were biologically related. 
B. The New-Fangled Way: Parenthood by Express Contract 
A great many children today are conceived by means other than sexual intercourse.111
Courts, with the weight of scholarly commentary behind them, almost always use contract to
determine who the parents of these children are.  In the most common and familiar case, the
biological father of a child born by virtue of insemination through a sperm bank has signed away
his rights and obligations as a father.  The law honors the sperm donor’s intent not to be a father
and the contract in which he makes that intent known.  Surrogacy contracts, which have gotten
considerably more media attention than sperm donation contracts, are also usually enforced.  
The degree of regulation varies from state to state, but few states ban surrogacy contracts and
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most states enforce them.112  With traditional surrogacy contracts, in which a woman enters a
contract with a man who provides the sperm which she then uses to impregnate  herself, the law
honors the traditional surrogate’s intent not to be a mother, despite her genetic connection to the
child.   The law finds the traditional surrogate’s intent in the surrogacy contract.113 When it
honors gestational surrogacy contracts, in which a surrogate mother gestates another woman’s
ova fertilized with another man’s egg, the law allows the gestational surrogate to sign away
whatever parental rights she might acquire by virtue of her gestational labor.   It also allows the
contract to bestow parental rights on the male and female genetic contributors.   It is the through
the contract, not the genetic contribution, that the “intended” parents acquire their parental rights. 
Johnson v. Calvert,114 probably the most well known and important gestational surrogacy
case decided to date, makes this perfectly clear.  In Johnson, after blood tests confirmed that the
egg donor was the genetic mother, the court was faced with conflicting presumptions of
motherhood under the California statute.  The surrogate acquired parental status by virtue of “her
having given birth to the child;”115 the genetic mother acquired her parental status by virtue of the
blood test.   The court found that “[b]ecause two women each have presented acceptable proof of
maternity, we do not believe this case can be decided without enquiring into the parties’
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intentions as manifested in the surrogacy agreement.”116    In letting contract interpretation guide
their decision about parental rights, the Court relied on commentators who have emphasized the
reliance interest117 and the expectations118 created in the intending parents by the contract.  
The Johnson court invoked a “but for” causation argument also, but the Court did not rule
that “but for” the Johnsons’ actions the child would not have been born. Instead the court wrote,
“[b]ut for their acted-on intention, the child would not exist.”119   Intent, not action, was at the
core of the decision. Thus the court held that when there are competing presumptions of
motherhood under the California act “she who intended to procreate the child -- that is, she who
intended to bring about the birth of a child that she intended to raise as her own -- is the natural
mother.”120  The Johnson court was confident enough of its analysis to go on to declare that “in a
true ‘egg donation’ situation, where a woman gestates and gives birth to a child formed from the
egg of another woman with the intent to raise the child as her own, the birth mother is the natural
mother under California law.”121    Less than a year later, the Supreme Court of New York was
faced with the very case the Johnson court foresaw.  Completely persuaded by Johnson’s
analysis, the New York court held that a gestational mother who had intended to raise the
children born from her as her own, was the natural mother even though she had no genetic
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connection to the children.122 
Courts in cases involving non-expert artificial insemination and usually involving no
written contract, also rely on intent to determine parenthood.123   In the absence of explicit
contract, courts find implicit ones.  In C.M. v. C.C.,124 a New Jersey court found relevant and
determinative the known donor’s “consent and active participation” in the artificial insemination
and from that evinced an intent “to assume the responsibilities of parenthood.”125   The sperm
donor was thus declared the father.  In Jhordan C. v. Mary K,126 although the Court explicitly
failed to reach the question of whether an oral or written nonpaternity agreement between the
parties would be binding,127 it nonetheless took particular care to note that the parties’ conduct
during the pregnancy and for three months after the birth did not evince an intent to exclude the
biological father.128  Hence the biological father was declared the father.  In R.C. v. J.R,129 the
Colorado Supreme Court, after surveying most of the decided cases and reviewing most of the
legal commentary on the subject,  held that the determinative question on whether the sperm
donor should receive parental status was whether “[the sperm donor and mother]  at the time of
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insemination agree that [the sperm donor] will be the natural father.”130  
Courts are more split on the role of intent when the party claiming parenthood is not
biologically related to the child and did not carry the child to term.  In Nancy S. v. Michele G.,131
a California court rejected the visitation claim of a woman who had, together with her partner,
decided to have and rear two children.  The non-child bearing partner sued for parental rights
after the couple split.  The partner was listed on each child’s birth certificate as the father, lived
with and helped raise the children for several years and shared custody of the children for a time
after the couple split.132   The court held that “[a]lthough the facts . . . [were] relatively
straightforward regarding the intent of the natural mother to create a parental relationship
between [the non-biological mother] and her children” using intent as a standard would be ill-
advised because it would depend too much on “elusive factual determinations.”133  In contrast, in
E.N.O. v. L.M.M. the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts relied extensively on a
coparenting agreement executed by a lesbian couple.134  So did a Pennsylvania court in J.A.L. v.
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E.P.H.  ”135   Preconception intent is critical to courts’ allocations of parental rights.136   In Karin
T. v. Michael T.,137 the court held that a woman who had changed his identity to become a man
and participated in a marriage ceremony with a woman was responsible for the children born to
the marriage through artificial insemination.  The parties had signed an agreement in which the
man agreed that the children were “his own legitimate . . . children.”138  The court held that “[t]he
contract and the equitable estoppel which prevail in this case prevent the respondent from
asserting her lack of responsibility by reason of lack of parenthood.”139  
In her book, Defining the Family, Law Technology and Reproduction in an Uneasy Age,
Janet Dolgin argues that in relying on intent in reproductive technology cases, courts have not
been relying on contract.140 She theorizes that courts are wary of relying on contract in this area
because contract principles invoke the rules of the marketplace and courts resist applying those
rules to the family.141   Had they been willing to rely on contract, she opines, they would have
simply looked to the documents and not struggled to discern intent.  In short, she argues that the
opinions use a subjective not an objective theory of contract and thus cannot accurately be
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described as relying on contract.142  Although Dolgin’s assessment of the courts’ discomfort with
these cases is certainly sound, she dismisses the importance of contract too readily.   Contracting
for parental rights outside of the construct of marriage is a novel, difficult and weighty
proposition.  There are, after all, very important third parties involved.  
The idea that courts would use simple objective theories of contract interpretation when
children’s existence and ultimate care are at stake is rather simplistic.  “Objective” interpretations
depend on context. “[S]ubjective intent . . . is relevant . . . insofar as it helps a court ascertain the
‘objective’ meaning of certain terms.”143  The meaning attached to words and actions is a
function of norms and conventions.144   Words and actions serve as manifestation of intent only
when there is a commonly understood convention that gives those words and actions meaning. 
The sheer novelty of contracts in the reproductive technology area makes it likely that courts will
need to struggle with objective interpretation.  There are no commonly understood conventions. 
In addition, the courts’ and the parties’ lack of familiarity with the technology make it important
for courts to scrutinize the contracts particularly carefully.  Finally, and possibly most important,
the parties to these contracts are contracting into and out of status that enjoys significant
constitutional protection.145  It is implausible and arguably inappropriate to think that at this
nascent stage of technological baby-making a court would enforce a surrogacy contract with the
facility and efficiency with which it enforces a contract for the sale of widgets.  The norms
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pursuant to which people act in this arena are still emerging and thus courts must be particularly
careful in assessing what words and actions will have what legal meaning.  This does not mean
that courts are not using contract. It means they are using contract carefully. 
C.  De Facto and Equitable Fathers: Parenthood by Implicit Contract
The final class of cases in which courts rely on contract theory involve de facto and/or
equitable fathers.  As mentioned earlier, a growing number of courts are holding non-biologically
related men responsible for the support of children for whom they have been functioning as
fathers.146   Courts also allow non-biologically related men who want to claim parental rights to
do so with regard to children for whom they have  been functioning as father.147   In both cases,
the courts estop one party from claiming a lack of paternity based on biology alone.   Various
different theories underlie these findings of estoppel, but they all involve notions of bargain or
reliance.  That is, they all involve notions of contract.    Those courts using a theory of implied or
express bargain emphasize the consideration the putative father has received by acting as father. 
Those courts using a theory of express148 or implied149 promise emphasize reliance.  
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In Clevenger v. Clevenger, a California court ruled that an express oral agreement to
support the child was enough to hold a non-biologically related man responsible as father.150   In
Wade v. Wade, a Florida court looked to the man’s behavior, holding himself out as the father,
claiming the son as a dependent, signing the birth certificate, as well as “the benefits of his
representations as the child’s father, including the child’s love and affection, his status as father .
. . and the community’s recognition of him as the father” to find the putative father estopped
from denying paternity.151    In another case involving a man trying to repudiate his paternity, a 
Pennsylvania court emphasized that  “the dispositive issue should be whether the putative father
has indicated by his conduct that the child is his own.”152    Because he had so indicated, he was
estopped from denying his paternity.  
Biological mothers can also be estopped from denying parental rights to men who have
acted as father.  Under both the equitable parent and de facto parent doctrines, a growing number
of states recognize rights in non-biologically related men who have acted as fathers.153  The
courts recognize these rights at the request of the men.  Quite obviously, if these men did not find
benefit in the parental relationship, they would not make claims for custody.  
All of these cases involve courts finding that the benefits a man receives by functioning
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as father confer rights and obligations that cannot be abandoned upon demand.  The obligations
follow the benefits because his behavior constitutes “conduct that would lead a reasonable person
in the [mother’s] position to infer a promise in return for performance or promise. . . ”154     The
mother can count on his continued support because she allowed him to enjoy the benefits of
fatherhood.   He can count on his continued ability to receive the benefits of fatherhood because
he met the obligations of fatherhood. 
Recently, courts have focused more on reliance and less on the benefit the putative father
received.  Sometimes courts talk about the reliance of the child;155 sometimes they talk about the
reliance of both the child and the mother.156   Often the courts are ambiguous about who relied157
and sometimes they talk only about the reliance of the mother.158   This confusion about who
must rely is understandable and ultimately unimportant.  To separate a child’s reliance from that
of his acknowledged parent makes no sense.  Unless one operates at the extremes of wealth, if a
parent is hurt financially -- as any parent would be if a source of support disappeared -- the child
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will be hurt also.  The child is in no position to rely financially because the child does not make
financial decisions.  To the extent that courts feel the need to find financial reliance,159 they
inevitably will look to reliance of the acknowledged parent (i.e., the mother), not just the child. 
When they find that reliance, they estop the putative father from disclaiming his support.  This
trend toward reliance suggests that courts are switching contract doctrines and relying more on
notions of promissory estoppel than mutual assent.   The nature of the relationship and/or the
longevity of the period of support readily support findings that the mother “rel[ied] on the
promise” and the putative father “had reason to expect the reliance that occurred.”160 
Whether they use theories of  mutual assent or promissory estoppel, courts are looking to
the functional relationship between two adults to determine parenthood.  By examining that
functional relationship they find intent and consideration and reliance. 
Before leaving the discussion of parenthood by implicit contract, it is also worth noting
that, perhaps unwittingly, the Supreme Court’s doctrine of paternal rights is remarkably
consistent with a contract theory.  The string of Supreme Court cases dealing with claims of
unwed fathers that starts with Stanley v. Illinois161 and ends with Michael H. v,. Gerald D.162
suggests that the most important factor in determining whether a genetic father will be entitled to
constitutional protection of his parental rights is his relationship with the mother.  In Stanley and
Caban v. Mohammed,163 cases in which the court protected the father’s constitutional rights as a
parent, one could readily find an implicit agreement between the mother and father to share
parental rights.  Peter Stanley had lived with the mother of his children intermittently for 18
Bargaining or Biology? 
164
 463 U.S. 248 (1983) 
165
 434 U.S. 246 (1978) 
166
 Lehr, 463 U.S. at 260, quoting Caban, 441 U.S. at 397 (emphasis added, citations and italics
omitted)
167
  The situation in Lehr is all the more significant because the uncontested facts revealed that
the mother actively prevented the biological father from developing such a relationship.  She did not agree
to him being the father of the child, and because of the greater control she had over the child at birth, her
desires trumped.  Lehr, 463 U.S. at 268-69.
168
  For further explication of this theory, see Janet Dolgin, Just a Gene: Judicial Assumptions
About Parenthood, 40 UCLA L. REV. 637 (1993) (arguing that the more the biological fa ther and m other’s
relationship resembles the stereotypical nuclear family, the more likely the Court is to acknowledge
paternal rights). 
169
 See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989).  (The mother in that case was married to
someone other than the biological fa ther. The court held that the biological connection plus a re lationship
with the child was not enough to secure constitutional protection for the biological father.) 
41
years.  Mr. Caban had consistently visited and sometimes assumed custody of his children for
five years.  In contrast, in Lehr v. Robertson164 and Quilloin v. Walcott165 the court denied both
biological fathers parental rights because neither had maintained a  relationship with the mother
of the children.   Justice Stewart’s dissent in Caban was quoted with approval by Justice Stevens
in Lehr.   “Even if it be assumed that each married parent after divorce has some substantive due
process right to maintain his or her parental relationship, it by no means follows that each unwed
parent has any such right.   Parental rights do not spring full-blown from the biological
connection between parent and child. They require relationships more enduring.”166    Justice
Stewart’s reference to marital status makes clear that the enduring relationships from which
paternal rights grow are relationships with the mother not just the child.167   When the
relationship with the mother is strong enough, and more particularly when the mother manifests
her intent and desire for the biological father to assume the role of father, the biological father
receives constitutional protection for his paternal rights.168  If the mother has not entered into a
relationship with the biological father with regard to parenting the child or if she has clearly
committed to parenting with someone else,169 biology alone will not grant fathers constitutional
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protection. 
D. Parenthood as Lived:  Contracts in Practice
The law’s comfort in letting contact, not biology, confer parental status may be partially
explained by parents’ willingness to let contract determine parental status. Agreement or
patterned behavior between biological mothers and fathers is the most important predictor of
paternal support.  Marital status is more important than race, education, age, and family size in
predicting the likelihood of a child support award.170  In one of the most comprehensive studies
of child support in this country, Andrew Beller and John Graham found that only 15% of never-
married mothers received child support awards.171   Close to half (43%) of never-married mothers
who did not receive an award said they did not want one, which suggests that mothers themselves
do not see biology as the lynchpin of male responsibility.172  
The great majority of women who do want a child support payment, and therefore sue for
paternity, pursue men with whom they have had a relationship of some duration.  Two-thirds of
paternity suits involve women suing men who were present at the birth of the child.173  Over 80%
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of unwed fathers help mothers with pregnancy either emotionally or financially.174  At the time of
the child’s birth, 82% of unwed parents are romantically involved, and 51% live together.175 
Approximately 85% of unmarried fathers continue their relationship with the mother through the
pregnancy and for an average of two to three years into the child’s life.176   Thus, the vast
majority of women who get child support from unmarried fathers have claims rooted in
relationship as well as blood. 
The most important factor in predicting continued contact between a separated father and
his children is the father’s relationship with the children’s mother.177  Significantly, his
relationship with the mother is more important than the extent of his involvement with the
children prior to separation.178  Interviews also suggest that men’s subjective sense of
responsibility toward their children is linked more to their feelings toward the mother than their
feelings toward their children.179  One of the most transparent manifestations of this phenomenon
is men’s tendency to support and nurture the children with whom they live more than children to
whom they are biologically related.180   Fathers who, for whatever reason, can no longer
cooperate with a former partner, often find a new one. It is the children of that new partner whom
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they support both financially and emotionally.181   Thus, when the parenting agreement with the
first woman breaks down, they make a new agreement with a new woman and they support that
new woman’s children. 
There are also significant groups of people, particularly low income people,  for whom
parenting apart has become the norm.182  In these groups, researchers have found that parental
status is “negotiated.”183   Frank Furstenberg argues that mothers and children in the inner city
don’t think of their biological fathers as their fathers unless those men have “done for”   the
children, both financially and emotionally.    Often,  the man who “does for” the child is not the
biological father.  The person who emerges as the father is the one whom the mother has allowed
to “do for” the child. 
Judges are also aware of the importance of the mother-father relationship.  Despite
Congress’ attempt to eliminate the distinction between marital and non-marital children, judges
award substantially more child support to women who were married to the father than to women
who were not.   After correcting for education, age, race, region and the number and ages of 
children, Beller and Graham still found an average award of $786 less for unmarried women.184 
The unmarried biological father’s likely lower income level may account for much of this
unexplained differential, but Beller and Graham estimate that at most it could account for 73% of
the differential.185  In other words, unmarried women get less child support simply because they
are not married. This suggests that the judges awarding the support view the marital agreement as
a critical part of determining the extent of the biological father’s responsibility. 
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In sum, as a matter of subjective expectation between the parties, as a matter of how
children actually experience who their parents are, and as a matter of how judges award child
support, implicit or explicit private agreements between adults play a critical role in determining
the extent of paternal responsibility.   This is not to say that private agreement or contract
explains all allocations of parental status.  The increased paternal identification requirements
passed as part of the 1996 Welfare Reform Act186 unabashedly adopt blood over contract as the
sin quo non of parenthood.   By most accounts, these measures have increased the amount of
child support paid by men.187   Moreover, as discussed in Section I, some courts refuse to honor
the intent of the biological parents particularly if the intent was to relieve the biological father of
obligation.188   My argument is not that contract or intent always governs, but that contract
governs much more than the letter of paternity law would suggest. 
III.  The Contract
The last section examined how law and real life already let principles from contract
determine parental status.  It was, for the most part, descriptive.  This section moves into the
normative in order to explore and justify in more detail the nature of the contractual relationship.  
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The first part of this section looks at contract formation and examines how a parental status
contract can be made under a reliance theory, a will theory, a bargain theory or a relational theory
of contract.   The second and third parts of this section look more closely at the terms of the
contract.  Part two analyzes the entitlement that is bargained for and part three analyzes the scope
of the contractual obligation incurred.  The rules explored in the latter parts of this Section are
presented in the spirit of an offer, examples of the ways in  which a contract regime might
operate.  I do not mean to suggest that the rules presented here are absolute or essential.   I invite
counter-offers.
A. Contract Theory
There are many theories of contract and it may well be impossible to explain all
contractual relations with one model.189   Without going into any one theory in too much detail,
this part will sketch how reliance and will theory, bargain theory and relational contract theory all
support the idea that parental status can arise from implicit or explicit agreements to share
parental rights and obligations.190 
1. Reliance and Will Theory
Reliance and will theory, both stalwarts of contract interpretation, are party-based theories
of contract formation.  The primary concern of both theories centers on the contracting parties;
reliance theories protect the promisee, while will theories protect the promisor.191  Either theory
can explain why the law should enforce a parental status contract.  It is easy to justify parental
contracts under a reliance theory because in most cases it is easy to find reliance on the part of
the mother and/or child.  The only question is whether the reliance is reasonable.  A mother’s
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reliance on a man’s explicit promise “to treat the baby as his own”192 hardly seems unreasonable,
particularly in light of a long history of letting the connection between husband and wife
determine the parenthood of the child.193  Relying on an implicit promise to support, though
potentially more ambiguous,  is unlikely to be unreasonable also.  The implicit promise will only
be found when the relationship between the promisor and the mother is obvious and
interdependent enough for the law to assume a promise.  By the same token, the longer and more
enmeshed the relationship, the more likely that reliance on the relationship is reasonable. Thus, if
one can find the implicit promise one can probably find reasonable reliance. 
Will theories are concerned with the promisor.194 In particular, will theories surmise that a
contract has not formed unless the terms of that contract reflect the will of the promisor.  Will
theory suffers from the subjective/objective problem discussed earlier.195  If the promisor’s
subjective will contradicts an objective interpretation of her words or actions, will theory
founders in its struggle to give words meaning.    As a result, will theories inevitably bend to
other interests, like reliance or fairness.196  Nonetheless, will theory cannot be dismissed entirely
because it gives moral force to why a promisor must be held to his promises.   Holding a
promisor accountable honors the promisor’s autonomy which she exercises in the contract by
manifesting her will.   Thus, the question from will theory in the parental contract context is
whether  imposing parental status on a provider because of  what he explicitly or implicitly
agreed to do respects his autonomy.    
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One’s response to this query probably depends on how one views the interdependency of
family groups.  If one sees all parties in a family as basically independent beings, as some have
argued the law increasingly construes them,197 then respecting autonomy might mean not binding
a man who has become a part of a family unit precisely because he is, at core, independent.   He
should be viewed by the parties and the law as an autonomous individual, free to exercise his
own will at any time.    He should, for instance, be able to say “I intended to have a relationship
with the mother, but not the child(ren).”   The law need not presume any other intention.  On the
other hand, if one sees family units, even nontraditional family units, as essentially
interdependent, then a man’s claim that his autonomy interest trumps the needs of the
interdependency seems remarkably feeble.  Unless a man explicitly claims “I intend to have a
relationship with you [the mother], but not your child(ren),” it may make more sense to assume
that he is willingly undertaking responsibility for the children because he is willingly interjecting
himself into an obviously interdependent unit.  The forseeability of the harm caused to everyone
by his withdrawal from the unit will be  transparent.198    By becoming part of a family unit, a
man (or woman) forseeably chooses to subordinate his autonomy interest.199  Under a will theory,
one can hold a man responsible as a father if he has acted like a father because it is simply
unreasonable for him to proclaim that his subjective intent was to be a “father-for-a-time,” with
that time ending whenever he walks away.  Family members form bonds and create dependencies
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that must be met on an on-going basis.200 
2.  Bargain Theory
The bargain theory of consideration, probably the best known and widely used theory of
contract, posits that a contract is a contract and not an unenforceable agreement when
consideration is bargained for and passes from both sides.  Bargain theory focuses less on the
parties and more on the process of contract formation.  To find a bargain contract in the parental
status context one needs to find bilateral consideration passing from both sides.  This is not hard. 
The mother offers to let her partner share in the parenting of her child/ren.  The father accepts by
participating, financially and emotionally.    The mother relinquishes some of her parental rights
in order to receive emotional and financial support.   The father incurs obligations for financial
support in order to participate emotionally in the life of the family.  He gains the benefits of
parenthood.  She loses control that she would otherwise have to steer the upbringing of the
child.201   The father figure cannot be heard to say that there are no benefits because all of the
petitions for rights and visitation made by non-biologically- related functional  parents attest to
the fact that functional fathers receive consideration.202  Thus, there is bilateral consideration and
there is a contract. 
3.  Relational Contract Theory
Relational contract theory looks to relationships between parties to find the existence and
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terms of a contract.203  Ian Macneil suggests that whenever an on-going relationship between the
parties is likely to be more important than a discrete transaction or communication between the
parties, the law should look to the relationship itself rather than to specific terms or the lack
thereof.    As Charles Goetz and Robert Scott put it, “[a] contract is relational to the extent that
the parties are incapable of reducing important terms of the arrangement to well-defined
obligations.”204  With relational contracts, the “existence of formal communication does not
automatically trigger the application of [] neoclassical” contract interpretation.205   “Rather the
preliminary question must always be asked: do the formal communications indeed reflect the
sharp past focus and strong intentions necessary to put these communications high in the priorites
of values created by the contractual relationship.”206   If the written agreement looks quite
obviously different than the lived relationship then the written agreement will have limited
importance.  In such a case one would look to the relationship itself to find terms.
The recent Family Law ALI guidelines for custody suggest a comparable approach to
determining the terms of a post-divorce custody award.   Instead of relying on abstract concepts
like joint custody, best interest of the child, or tender years presumptions, the ALI argues that
courts should use the past relationship to determine future rights and obligations.207  In many
ways, the ALI rules adopt suggestions made by Robert and Elizabeth Scott in a piece that
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explored the benefits of viewing marriage as a relational contract.208  Among other suggestions in
that piece, the Scotts argue that relational contract theory can help determine optimal custody and
support rules for divorce.   I am arguing that relational contract theory is just as good at helping
courts determine custody and support issues even if the parties were never married and even if
they are not biologically related to the children.  In other words, relational contract theory is just
as good at determining parental status as it is at determining custody rights.  The relationships of
unmarried parents or married people whose children are not necessarily their biological issue do
not differ in material ways from the relationships of married people whose children are their
biological issue.  The interdependency and exchange and reliance are often identical.   Once one
acknowledges that legally enforceable rights and obligations can come from the relationship
itself, not only from some formal legal agreement, then it is not hard to find parental rights and
obligations bestowed by virtue of the relationship.  Once one finds parental rights and obligations
bestowed by virtue of relationship, one finds parental rights and obligations bestowed by virtue
of implied contract.  If parental rights and obligations are bestowed by virtue of contract, parental
status is bestowed by virtue of contract. 
The next part explores the terms of the contract in more detail.  My claim is that contract
theory and doctrine provide a superior framework for determining parental status than does the
current regime.  My claim is not that all agreements to parent are obviously legally enforceable
contracts.   The relationship between mother and father, at least if it is significant enough to give
rise to parental status, is likely to be complex and messy and subjective; it is not likely to
conform to the classical model of contract.209   However,  as most contract scholars agree, there
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are precious few arrangements, commercial or otherwise, that conform to the classical model of
contract.210  “All contracts are relational, complex and subjective.”211  The debate between current
contract scholars is not about whether contracts are discrete willful acts with defined objective
terms (almost none of them are), but about the role contract law should play in adjudicating
contractual disputes involving complicated relationships, modified terms and irrational
behavior.212    There are those who want to expand contract law to better incorporate all of the
bargaining relationships that do not conform to the classical model.213   There are others who
suggest that we are better off restricting judges to their traditional role as formalistic interpreters
of objective terms because judges are quite incapable of incorporating adequately or fairly the
variety of norms and subjective understandings that permeate most contractual relationships.214  
The model offered here is consistent with either an expansive or a restricted understanding of
contract interpretation.  The rules we choose to apply to agreements between people who act like
parents may be a function solely of private agreement, of public policy or of some
combination.215  An expansionist might look to a vast array of norms, relationships and policy
concerns to interpret the contract between mother and father.  A formalist might make all
necessary policy determinations ex ante and impose legislatively mandated boiler plate for many
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or most parental status contracts.216   Whichever rules we choose to apply, contract doctrine can
be used “as a structure of argument.”217  
   
B.  The Entitlement at Issue
Before one can accept the idea that parental obligations can arise from contract one must
accept the idea that parental status can be appropriately conceptualized as property, or at least an
amalgam of alienable rights and obligations.  As many have noted, there is an intrinsic
relationship between contracts and property.218  Contracts are vehicles for transferring property.  
In Randy Barnett’s formulation, a contract is a “manifestation of an intention to alienate
rights.”219     I have elsewhere explained some of the benefits of using property paradigms in the
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family law area.220  Among other things, property paradigms help courts resolve  competing
claims to child custody in a manner that maintains family autonomy and rewards those adults
who have sacrificed for and invested in the child.221   Nonetheless, there is a strong resistance to
property rhetoric when it comes to characterizing family relationships, particularly relationships
with children.222  It may be more palatable to think of an agreement between parents not as a
contract for property but as a “manifestation of an intention to alienate rights.”223  Whatever
formulation one chooses,  if one acknowledges that courts are currently using notions of contract
to guide their decisions as to parental status, then one acknowledges that courts are currently
using notions of property to determine parental status.   Therefore it is important for us to analyze
the nature of the property at issue.  What is it that is transferred between adults that allows courts
to reach conclusions as to parental status?   
1. The Origins of the Entitlement
The property at issue in the parental contract is the entitlement to parental status.  Parental
status brings with it parental rights.  For some, parental rights include the rights to discipline and
educate, and the rights to choose medical treatment, religious traditions, geographical location
and social contacts for their children.224  For others, in particular those parents who are not
married to the other parent of a child, parental rights are more limited.  They are more limited
because in cases of conflict between two never married or divorced parents, it is a court that
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decides what is in the child’s best interest.225  Nonetheless, in those cases, parental status at least
brings with it the procedural right to challenge the ways in which a child is being reared. 
Parental status also brings with it a presumptive right to spend time with the child. Even if one
does not have legal custody, all states have a heavy presumption in support of parental
visitation.226   It is that visitation that many non-biological parents fight for when biological
parents want to keep them at bay.227  
Parental status also brings with it obligations, most obviously the duty to support the
child. At present, as described earlier, the degree of one’s obligation is not tied to the strength of
one’s entitlement to a relationship with the child. One’s obligation is a simple function of one’s
income, a raw percentage, and that attaches absolutely and regardless of one’s relationship with
the child.   
The contractual model offered here suggests that when adults contract for parental status
they contract to either alienate or acquire parental status vis a vis a child. Parents who alienate
their parental rights are agreeing to share those rights with someone else.  They are agreeing to
co-parent. They are agreeing to give someone else the procedural right to challenge the way in
which the child is being reared and to give that person a right to petition for visitation.  The co-
parents who receive these rights are agreeing to accept the rights and responsibilities (i.e., the
duty to support) of parenthood.  They accept the contract because, for whatever reason, they want
to act as a parent to a child. 
There still is a question of initial entitlement though.  One can only agree to contract
away property that one has.  Where do the rights come from for those parents who have not
gotten them through exchange with another parent?  One might think the answer to that question
is the genetic material that one’s body produces.  Hence, men could sell sperm and women could
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sell eggs and in doing so they would alienate not only their genetic material but the parental
status that might accompany that genetic material.  If this were the case though, genetic
connection per se would give one parental status as long as one had not contracted that status
away.  As we saw, such is not the case either constitutionally or as a matter of common law. 
Men who are genetically connected to a child do not necessarily enjoy the rights (or the
obligations) of parenthood if someone else is filling the parental role.228 
Instead, the property interest appears to emanate with the mother.  De facto if not de jure,
it is the gestational mother who controls whether a biological father, or any other person, is able
to establish a relationship with the child and thereby secure parental rights.229   As a  preliminary
matter, it is the pregnant woman and only the pregnant woman who decides whether to remain
pregnant.  Once that decision is made, the pregnant woman can,  with remarkable ease, prevent a
biological father from ever knowing about a child’s existence.  For biological parents who are
not living together,  it is the woman who decides whether the biological father knows about the
pregnancy, how participatory the biological father (or any other potential “father”) can be during
the pregnancy and, at least when the child is young, how much contact the father can have.230  
She can thereby all but ensure that his parental rights will never be exercised. She can also take
measures to make it very likely that parental status will be vested in someone else. She can do
that by marrying someone else, by letting someone else adopt the child or by simply sharing her
life with someone else.  As numerous researchers have found, women have always determined
Bargaining or Biology? 
231
  Jane Mosely & Elizabeth Thom son, Fathering Behavior and Child Outcomes: The Role of
Race and Poverty, in FATHERHOOD: CON TEM PORARY THEORY, RESEARCH AND SOCIAL POLIC Y 148 (W illiam
Marsiglio ed., 1995) (“W omen orchestrate men’s relationships with children.” ) DOW D, supra  note 50, at
121 (“[M]others are the gatekeepers or facilitators to men’s relationships with children.”) 
232
  This is less true for biological parents who are living together, but as long as the woman has
an exit alternative, she has a means of b lock ing the biological father’s involvem ent. 
233
  Justice Stewart in his Caban dissent that was subsequently quoted by the majority in Lehr did
indicate that gestational labor was a critical factor in distinguishing between the initial parental rights of two
biological parents.  “The mother carries and bears the child, and in this sense her parental relationship is
clear. The validity of the father’s parental claims must be gauged by other measures.”  Lehr v. Robertson,
463 U.S. 248, 260 n.16 (1983), citing Caban v. Moham med, 441 U.S. 380, 397 (1979). 
234
 See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993).
235
 See E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886 (Mass. 1999) (lesbian couple signed parenting
agreement prior to the birth of the children delineating their intention to share parental rights and
obligations). 
236
  As I have previously described it, a “A biological father gives his sperm.  A gestational mother
gives: her egg (usually), her liver, her bladder, her iron supply, her pulmonary system, her digestive
system, the elasticity of her skin and often her psychological well-being.”  Baker, supra  note 220 at 1586.
57
the extent of paternal involvement with children.231  From conception on, de facto parental status
is something that the woman has and can, at her discretion, mete out to someone else.232 
Although courts have never put it in these terms,233 the above suggests that the gestational
mother gains parental status through her gestational investment, not through her genetic
contribution.  A father gains parental status through his relationship with the mother.  If the
gestational mother has not contracted her labor out (in a gestational surrogacy contract)234 or
previously agreed (through marriage or  another form of contract)235  to share parental rights, then
she has exclusive control.  Once she agrees, either explicitly or implicitly, to share that control,
she has a co-parent. 
To some this paradigm may seem highly unfair. The woman, by virtue of labor that a man 
cannot give, has more access to parenthood does a man.  Yet the very same factors that make it
unfair to hold an unwilling man liable for a child that he never wanted, make it appropriate to
vest the gestational mother with sole parental status. It is her decision to undergo the huge and
very costly burdens of pregnancy.236 Up until birth, the mother has, of necessity, invested far
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more of herself than has the biological father.  Conscientious men may try to invest time and
money in the pregnancy, but the decision as to whether to accept that effort is the mother’s.  At a
very basic level, there is simply no comparison between what a mother necessarily gives during
pregnancy and what a man can give.  Thus, by virtue of her sole responsibility and labor, the
mother obtains sole parental rights.  It follows, then, that she should shoulder all the obligation.   
What this paradigm suggests, quite logically, is that all pregnant women should be treated
alike.  A woman who gets pregnant the old fashioned way should be treated just as a woman who
gets pregnant by virtue of artificial insemination.  If there is a pre-existing marriage or contract
suggesting that the pregnant woman intends to share her rights and responsibilities, the law
should honor that contract and vest parental status in a co-parent.  If there is no such contract, the
woman is on her own.237 
2.  Limitations on the Contract
 To a certain extent, the degree to which a mother shares the rights and responsibilities
that she acquires by virtue of gestation is up to her, but the number of people she can contract
with and the extent to which she can completely alienate her parental status must be limited. 
Scholars disagree about the relative harms and benefits of multiple parental figures in a child’s
life,238 but most can probably agree that there should be some limit on the number of legal
“parents” a child should have.  The more adults that have standing to assert visitation rights and
challenge the parenting decisions of others, the greater the likelihood of litigation.  As almost all
family law commentators have recognized, judges are remarkably ill-prepared and institutionally
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ill-suited to make sound parenting decisions.239   The more people there are with parental rights
vis a vis the same child, the greater the likelihood that a judge will be deciding what is in that
child’s best interest.    The extraordinary pecuniary and emotional toll this can take on a child
suggests that, for the child’s sake, the law should limit the number of contracts a mother can
make with regard to any one child.240  
On the other hand, if a father abandons a mother and child, the mother should be able to
contract with someone else.  By abandoning, the first father loses his right to be a parent and
frees the mother up to contract with someone else.  If she contracts with someone else that new
person becomes the father, with his own parental rights and obligations. The first father stays
obligated until the mother contracts with someone else. Once she does, the first father loses
rights and obligations.  This is what currently happens in the adoption context 241 
The law should also limit the extent to which the mother can alienate her rights.  The
bonding and reliance that give rise to the equitable and de facto parenthood doctrines242 suggest
that a parent should not be able to alienate her rights and responsibilities completely.  That is, she
should not be able to sell her child.   Children form bonds. In order to protect those bonds, the
law must  forbid the complete alienation of a parent’s parental rights.  If a parent abdicates her
rights by abandoning the child, the law cannot necessarily stop her or him, but the law can forbid
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a parent from getting paid to effect such an abandonment.243    
3.  Abandonment and Contractual Rights
Unfortunately, parenting studies suggest that abandonment by fathers is common.   Forty
to sixty percent of children do not live with their fathers.244  Only sixteen percent of children in
fatherless households see their father at least once a week.245  Forty percent of children who live
in fatherless households have not seen their fathers at all in the past year.246  The chances of a
child not having seen his or her father increase with time.  One study found that ten years after
divorce, nearly two-thirds of the children of those divorces have not seen their father at all in the
past year.247   Abandonment by mothers is not unheard of, but  noncustodial mothers are much
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more likely than noncustodial fathers to visit their children.248  In other words, women abandon
but with far less frequency. 
The prevalence of abandonment by fathers suggests that a legal label of father does not 
keep men sufficiently connected to their children to ensure that child support gets paid or that
contact gets maintained.     Thus, it is not clear we would have any fewer involved and paying
fathers if the law acknowledged that abandonment and deprived abandoning fathers of their legal
status as parents.  Abandonment would also not relieve a parent of parental status unless the
other parent contracted with someone new.  A parent stays liable for the terms of the contract
unless the other parent has mitigated the damages caused by the disintegration of the first
agreement by finding another parent who explicitly or implicitly agrees to assume parental
status.249 The proposed regime thus gives no added incentive for fathers to abandon children.  
The greater concern is probably the incentive effect on potential new fathers.   Will
subsequent men form a relationship with a mother if they know that they could become legally
responsible for her children?  It is this very concern that makes some judges wary of holding
step-parents responsible for child support.250  There are several responses.   First, the elasticity of
men’s preference curves may not be as great as the concern suggests. If someone wants to share
his life with a woman and her family, the factors urging him to do so may well overwhelm
misgivings he has about future liability.  This is particularly likely to be true if one assumes that
the pool of women with whom he might share his life is heavily populated by women with
children.  Second, the extent to which many men already serial parent suggests that men are not
averse to taking on new responsibility.  They are averse to having contact with their ex-partners. 
Most divorced and separated men have children in their lives, even if those children are not their
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biological issue.251  The proposal offered here would make these men’s decision-making process
with regard to children a little clearer.  If they are going to have children in their lives, they must
either continue their contact with an ex-spouse/partner or incur the risk of new liability with
another mother.   Third, if on the one hand people are concerned that men won’t become
involved with children that are not their biological issue because those men will be worried about
future liability, and the other hand people are concerned about the extent to which men already
abandon their biological issue, we need to rethink current presumptions regarding men’s
entitlement to parent.   If, because they could avoid child support, most men would avoid having
children in their lives, it tells us something remarkably disturbing about the likelihood that men
will be responsible parents.   If we cannot count on men to be responsible parents, it is not clear
why we should be concerned about granting them parental rights at all. 
By honoring contracts to share parental rights, the law honors the emotional and financial
bonds that develop between children and adults.  Particularly if the number of parents stays
limited, there is every reason to believe that children will benefit from a contract to share parental
rights.  The financial and emotional burdens of single parenthood, though not insurmountable,
are significant.252  By finding someone with whom to share those burdens, a mother helps ensure
that a child has both the emotional and financial support that he or she needs.  Currently, the law
often assigns a second parent on the basis of biology.   Empirical research and common sense
suggest that biology alone is a significantly inferior proxy of willingness to support than is an
agreement with the mother.  An agreement with the mother is volitional action or words with
regard to parenting, not action with regard to sexual behavior.   It is a decision by two adults to
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share parenting.253   Far more deliberation and concern is likely to go into a decision as to
whether to share one’s life with a woman and her child then is likely to go into a decision as to
whether to have sex.  
In sum, the entitlement at issue in parenting contracts is the entitlement to parental rights
and responsibilities.  As an initial matter, unless she has already agreed to share part of that
entitlement, the mother has an exclusive right to that entitlement.  If she has agreed to share it,
the person with whom she has so agreed is the other parent. If she has not previously agreed to 
share, she is the sole parent unless and until she contracts with someone else.  The terms of her
contract must be limited, however. She cannot alienate her rights completely.  She must always
remain a parent and she can only contract with multiple people if a former contracting partner has
abandoned the contract.254   If a former contracting partner has abandoned,255 a new person may
assume the previous partner’s status by contracting with the mother.   
C. The Obligation at Issue
The previous parts explained how and why the law of contract can determine parental
status.  This part explains how the law of contact can also help determine the extent of parental
obligation. The contract regime like the one offered here can help reorient the law’s approach to
how much child support a parent owes. As discussed above, federal legislation currently requires
that all states establish numerical criteria and guidelines that determine child support obligations
based on a raw percentage of income.  The extent of the noncustodial parent’s previous
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relationship with the mother and/or the child is irrelevant.  This might change, at least for some
fathers,  if the law took the notion of contract more seriously.
In cases of explicit contract, the obligation owed by the father would be determined by
the explicit contract or the background rules the law imposed on those contracts.  For instance, in
cases of marriage or adoption, the law might demand that a person who explicitly contracts to be
a father is contracting to be a father for the entire minority of the child.    Even if the marriage
only lasted two years, the father would be obligated as father for 18 years of the children’s lives
because that is what he agreed to.256   An agreement to marry would be a legal agreement to share
parenting during and after the relationship, just as an agreement to marry is a legal agreement to
share income streams during and after the marriage.257   These cases would look identical to what
we have today and the award could be established under the current income percentage guideline
system.   
In cases of implicit contract, however, the law might make the child support obligation
proportional to the interdependence within the family.     If one discerns parental status from the
behavior of the mother and father, not from their explicit agreement, one must ask what that
behavior tells us about the duration of the obligation.  Is it appropriate to discern an 18 year
commitment from a relationship that lasted two years?   The answer could be yes simply because
we can impute to any  potential father the responsibility for understanding that fatherhood is
permanent.  The problem with this answer is that even now when the law says that fatherhood is
permanent, a vast number of children and fathers fail to experience it that way.  Why should we
expect men to understand the inevitability of something that is demonstrably not inevitable? 
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Why not hold men responsible for an obligation defined by the extent of the relationship?258
For instance, if the family existed as a family for seven years, the father could be
obligated as a family member for another seven years.  At the end of those additional seven years
his contractual obligation would be fulfilled and he could cease payment.  He would also,
however, lose his parental status.  The extent of the relationship would determine the extent of
the obligation.  He would be bound while separated for as long a period of time as he was
together with the family unit.259  Every year that he demonstrates his desire to be a part of the
family, enjoys the benefits of family and lets the other family members come to rely on him as a
member of the unit, he incurs a year of post-separation obligation.  Every year that the mother
lets him parent, she incurs a year of post-separation infringement on her parental rights.260    If the
noncustodial parent does not want to lose his parental status at the end of his required obligation
(seven years in the above example), he should be allowed to maintain his parental status by
maintaining his obligation.  That is, he can opt into permanent parental status.  A person who has
acted as a parent for the full length of the contract and whom the mother has accepted as a parent
should be able to maintain that status permanently.261   Thus, the ability to terminate the
relationship at the contract’s end would be vested solely in the noncustodial parent, likely the
father.  This would minimize the chances that children would have to suffer the loss of a parent. 
 At a theoretical level, this regime differs substantially from the regime we have now, but
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in practice, the number of payments might well be similar.   The separated father who meets his
obligation for the full contract term is likely to be concerned and involved enough with his
children’s lives to maintain his support.  If he wants to maintain his rights to see his children, he
will have to maintain his support.262 He will stay father for eighteen years.   
Many fathers who are supposed to stay fathers for eighteen years under the current regime
do not, however.  They abandon two to three years after separation.  A regime that explicitly
limited their obligation would not make much difference.  At the margin, in some cases,  one
might see a difference.    For instance, a man who was only obligated for three years might only
pay for three years, whereas now, because he’s obligated for fifteen years he pays for five years.  
This is possible, but highly speculative; the fathers that pay are likely to visit and if they visit
they are not likely to want to relinquish their parental status.   
As it is now, there is a hesitancy to hold non-biologically related men who have clearly
been a part of a family unit to the obligations they have incurred as part of the unit precisely
because their behavior does not seem to warrant holding them responsible for the child’s full
minority; the current law does not have a way of holding them responsible for something though
less than everything.   The rigidity of the system now, both in terms of who is responsible for
paying and what he is responsible for paying may help make uniform the awards that courts
order, but there is no place in the current system for multiple or serial fathers.  This means that
men who gain the benefits of parenthood are often left free to ignore the burdens of parenthood,
and some men who have never enjoyed the benefits of parenthood because they never wanted it,
are nonetheless required to pay.263  
Using the construct of contract doctrine further, courts could determine child support with
reference to the damages suggested by the contract.  Whether one labels these damages
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reasonable reliance or expectation damages, the calculation would likely be the same.  Parents
rely on other parents by incurring debt, forgoing jobs and forgoing other relationships that might
bring in more money.   The longer a family unit lasts, the greater the reliance, the more
reasonable the expectation that the support will continue and the larger the number of
opportunities to contract with someone else that will have passed by.  The child support award
should reflect those costs.264
This is not to say that child support awards should be the reliance or expectation measure,
per se.  To make it such would assume that the noncustodial parent was necessarily the breaching
party.   Not only would this run the risk of re-introducing problematic fault determinations into
family law,265 it would necessarily make the financial cost of break-up for the non-custodial
parent greater than the cost of break-up on the custodial parent.  The custodial parent would not
have to bear any of the costs associated with losing the economies of scale that accompany
shared living space.266  Although it might be nice to spare the child the cost of those lost
economies, such an approach is not realistic and unfair to non-custodial parents who may not
have done anything wrong.  Instead, reliance and expectation measures should be used as a
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ceiling from which to determine the child support award.  From that ceiling, judges can
determine an appropriate child award measure, taking into account the costs that will be
associated with the noncustodial parent having to establish a home for himself.267
Admittedly, child support awards under such a system would be harder to determine and
more variable than they are now.  Some readers may legitimately question whether contract law
is up to the task of determining what the award should be.  Figuring out the primary caretaker’s
reliance or expectation interest will be very difficult.  Indeed, it is a difficulty that, historically,
family law was familiar with.  Before the federal legislation requiring uniform percentage grid
systems for determining child support,268 family court judges around the country had very little
guidance on what standards should be used to determine child support.  Several studies
concluded that this led to wildly erratic system, both because of too few awards of child support
being ordered269 and because of too much variability in the awards that were made.270   The
percentage grid system brought a great deal of wanted consistency to child support awards.271  
The grid system is popular and works well in many contexts, but it seems ill-suited to
deal with situations in which notions of fatherhood (or parenthood) are contested.  It is one thing
to say that someone who everyone agrees is and should be treated as a father as traditionally
understood must pay 20% or 25% of his income in child support regardless of how well that
percentage figure actually reflects the caretaker’s reliance or need.  It is another thing to say that
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someone who never intended to be or acted as father should be so responsible, and it is still
another thing to say that someone who never explicitly accepted the responsibilities of
fatherhood but nonetheless let others reasonably rely on him as a father for a period of years
should be responsible for paying 20% of his income in child support for the full period of the
child’s minority.  This latter man is a father of sorts, but should he be a father forever? 
If one answers yes to that question and is comfortable holding temporary or implicit
fathers responsible for supporting a child for the full term of the child’s minority then one can
simply use the grid.  The grid system could apply to anyone who is a father and one need not
look t contract doctrine to help craft an award.  In such a regime, we would use on contract law
only to determine who the father is, not what he owes.  At the other extreme, if one thinks the
contract regime should be adopted in total, then we should abandon the grid system altogether
and let the wording and/or nature of the adult contract always determine the extent of the parental
obligation.  This article endorses a middle course, one that uses the popular uniform grid system
in cases where there is ready consensus on who the father is and on the scope of his obligation,272
but one that endorses more of a reliance based system in cases where paternal status is more
tenuous and the scope of the obligation more ambiguous. 
Thus, under the system proposed here, most of the men held responsible now and any
man who willingly opted into the status of permanent father could still be bound by the current
guidelines. Remember, though, that many of the men who would be held responsible under a
contract regime currently have no liability under the guidelines because they are not the
biological fathers of the child.   The contract-based support amount would most likely apply to
unmarried biological fathers who currently pay sporadically and incompletely and to non-
biological fathers who rarely pay anything at all. 
As it is now, the determining factor in whether a non-biological father owes anything is
often  whether the biological father can be found.  This is an arbitrary system that makes
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nonbiological father’s obligation a function of what someone else does, and a biological father’s
obligation a function of his sexual conduct, not his parenting conduct.   The regime offered here
would eliminate that arbitrariness.  Parents who have parented would be obligated as parents.
This regime would be harder to administer because it is nuanced, but it is nuanced in a way that
reflects the reality of contemporary parenting. A more flexible, albeit potentially more variable
system stands a better chance of making men who currently act as fathers, responsible as fathers. 
D. Examples
Some examples may help bring the various strands of this proposal together. 
1. The Easy Cases
Frank, a New York City police officer made famous in print and on film for his
willingness to expose corruption in the Police Department, slept with a woman named Pamela,
who told him she was using birth control when she knew that she was not.273  Pamela got
pregnant and sued Frank for child support.  In 1983, a New York court found Frank liable for
child support in an amount proportional to what he earned.274  Under the proposed regime, Frank
would not be liable for child support, nor would he have any rights as a father.  The rights and
responsibilities for any child born of the sexual liaison would be vested in Pamela alone unless
and until she found someone else willing to assume the role of father.
Tamara Budnick and Frederick Silverman signed an agreement in which they agreed that
Frederick would not assume any responsibility for a child born of their sexual liaison.275  In 2002,
a Florida court found Silverman responsible for child support notwithstanding the contract. 
Under the proposed regime, he would not be responsible because the contract clearly indicates
his intent not to parent. 
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Ann and Dudley Nygard met in July of 1982.276  In October of 1982, Ann discovered that
she was 5 months pregnant.  Dudley asked Ann to stay with him, notwithstanding both of their
knowledge that the pregnancy could not have resulted from their sexual activity. He also agreed
“to raise the child as his own.”277   Ann and Dudley married in December of 1982 and separated 
in May of 1984.  A Michigan court ordered  Dudley to pay child support, finding either that the
oral contract was enforceable, of, if barred by the statute of frauds, that Dudley was bound under
doctrines of equitable or promissory estoppel.278   Under the current regime, the case would come
out precisely the same way, either because of Dudley’s explicit promise to act as father or
because, by marrying Ann he agreed to be a father to any children born of the marriage.279 
Stephen and Robin Markov were married in 1986.280  Ten months later, Robin gave birth
to twins.  After a rocky marriage, the parties separated in March of 1997.  The parties agreed that
by 1992,  both realized that the twins were not Stephen’s biological issue.  Nonetheless, Stephen
continued to see the twins and make child support payments until May of 1998.  At that time,
Stephen denied responsibility for supporting the twins based on his lack of biological connection. 
A Maryland court found that Stephen could be held responsible for child support,
notwithstanding the lack of genetic connection, but only upon Robin presenting sufficient
evidence that the biological father could not be found.281  Under the proposed regime, the
presence of the biological father would be irrelevant.  Stephen would be held responsible as
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father and would have rights as father because he agreed to raise children born to the marriage.282 
2. The Harder Cases
Amy and Tom dated fairly regularly but were not married.  Amy got pregnant. Tom
supported her emotionally and with some financial assistance throughout the pregnancy. He was
present at the birth of the child (Lisa) and stayed as a regular presence in Amy and Lisa’s life
until Lisa was three years old.  He contributed to Amy’s  household, paying for food, clothes and
other expenses for the Lisa.   By the time Lisa was three, Tom began to drift away.  He was
around much less and contributed almost nothing. By the time Lisa was four, Amy no longer
knew where he was.  
At this point, Amy could sue for paternity. The suit would be based on an implicit
promise to support though, not on Tom’s blood relationship to Lisa.  The facts of this paternity
case would look remarkably similar to the average facts alleged in paternity suits now.  As
mentioned, most fathers sued in paternity were present for the birth of the child and remained in
a relationship with the mother for two to three years after the child’s birth.283   What would likely 
be different is the extent of Tom’s obligation. Tom would be liable for an amount of support that
reflected Ann’s reasonable reliance on his contributions. He would be liable for, for instance,
three years of subsequent support.  During those three years he would have full parental rights. If
he paid for those three years - and at any time prior to the end of those three years - he would
have the right to opt into permanent parental status. If he did so, the amount of his obligation
would be determined by standard child support guidelines. 
If Amy did not sue Tom for paternity, it is very likely that another man (call him Bill)
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would enter Amy and Lisa’s life and assume a parent-like role.284  As Bill provided continuing
emotional and financial support to Amy and Lisa’s household, he would make himself potentially
responsible and potentially protected as a father.   Whether Bill became legally responsible would 
depend on whether Tom had drifted away. If Tom was an obvious presence in Lisa’s life, then
there could be no reasonable reliance on Bill as father.  However, if Tom ceased acting as father,
he would be deemed to have abandoned his paternal relationship, and Bill could assume that role
either explicitly or implicitly.    Again, the facts of this situation are perfectly common.285  If Amy
and Bill explicitly agreed that Bill should assume parental status, the situation would be
functionally identical to the hundreds of step-parent adoptions that currently happen every year in
this country.286   Bill would be the equivalent of a step-parent adopter and Tom’s right would be
terminated during that adoption proceeding.287  What would be different is if Amy and Bill did
not explicitly agree that Bill would assume parental status. Under the proposed model, a court
should be free to infer such an agreement in the absence of explicit words or contract.  Once that
agreement can be inferred from the parties behavior, Bill can sue Amy to maintain contact with
Lisa if Amy tries to bar him from such, and Ann can sue Bill for support if Bill drifts away like
Tom did. 
3. The Modern Cases 
Dick and Fred are a gay couple that wants to have a child.  Dick enters into a surragacy
arrangement with Beth.  Either using an ovam purchased from someone else or using Beth’s
ovum, Beth is impregnated with Dick’s sperm.  Pursuant to the surrogacy contract, Beth
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relinquishes all her parental rights at birth.  If Dick has not previously signed a parenting
agreement with Fred, Dick is the sole parent.  If Dick and Fred have signed a parenting
agreement, Dick and Fred are the co-parents to the child born as a result of the surrogacy
agreement. 
Laura is a single woman. She wants to be a mother.  She convinces her friend Gary to
have intercourse with her in the hope that she will get pregnant.   Laura and Gary never discuss
Gary’s future role as a father.  Laura gets pregnant and gives birth to Billy.  During the pregnancy
and after birth Laura and Gary maintain their friendship.   Gary sees Billy from time to time,
often bringing him gifts.  The relationship between Laura and Gary cannot be considered
interdependent.  They do not live together; they do not provide for each other economically; they
do not make mutual decisions about Billy’s well-being; Laura does not rely on Gary for care or
support of Billy. .  Laura cannot sue Gary for child support and Gary cannot sue Laura for
parental rights.288  If Laura chooses to, she can marry or otherwise contract with another man or
woman.  It would be by virtue of that subsequent contract that Billy would acquire a second
parent. 
IV.  Advantages and Disadvantages
Using contract doctrine as a construct through which to interpret parental status offers a
more coherent paradigm than does the current system.  It also does a better job of incorporating
contemporary mores and contemporary technology. In addition, it has positive policy
implications.  It also has some negative policy implications.  This section looks at the policy
advantages and disadvantages of a parental status regime based on contract. 
A. Advantages
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The proposed model embraces two major distinctions that contemporary family law
ignores: first, the distinction between mothers and fathers (or primary caretakers and secondary
caretakers),289 and second, distinctions between fathers. In doing so it eliminates two distinctions
that currently have great salience in the law of parenthood; the distinction between
“technologically produced” and “regularly produced” children, and the distinction between
straight parents and gay parents.290   The proposed model eliminates the current distinction
between technologically produced children and others by adopting the model that we currently
use for determining the parenthood of technologically produced children: contract. Under the
proposed regime as under the contemporary law of reproductive technologies, preconception
intent, as manifested in an agreement with the gestational mother, would be the critical factor in
determining parenthood at birth, and post-conception intent, as manifested, implicitly or
explicitly, in an agreement with the primary caretaker, would be the critical factor in determining
parental rights and obligations as the child grows.    The proposed model eliminates the
distinction between gay and straight parents also because it acknowledges that one gains parental
status not by a biological connection to the child but by contributing to and situating oneself in
the interdependence of a family structure that includes children.  Whereas courts now often
struggle to determine the status of the non-biological gay parent/partner, under the proposed
regime it would be clear. That person, man or woman, is the “father” and she or he is the father
by virtue of an agreement with the mother. 
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At this point, readers concerned about sex equality are probably bristling at the labels of
mother and father.  How can we achieve sex equality, much less degender caretaking,291 if we
structure the law of parenthood around the very sex differences that we are trying to eliminate?
As mentioned in the introduction, this article uses the term mother in its biological and social
sense, but not necessarily in the sense that it means “female parent.” Comparably, it uses the term
father to mean “partner of mother” not necessarily “male parent.”    I do this, following Martha
Fineman’s lead,292 to ensure that what has legal meaning and value is precisely the biological and
cultural contributions that mothers have traditionally made.  What need not be salient is the sex
of the person parenting.  If a man is mothering a child because the female parent has abandoned
the child, or for any other reason, then the law should treat that man as a mother.  If a woman is
fathering a child by supporting the family structure economically while someone else is doing
more of the caretaking, then the law should treat that woman as a father.  If both parents are
doing identical jobs, then the labels are irrelevant anyway.  For the most part, the law needs to be
concerned with the rights and obligations of parenthood only when a family unit breaks up and
the parties look to the law to determine relative responsibilities.   The labels of mother and father
are remarkably unimportant at that stage because the contract analogy proposed suggests that the
rights and obligations should be based on the established pattern of behavior of the family as it
existed when it was intact.  Which sex held which role is irrelevant. The rights and obligations
follow the established role, not gender. 
Of course, the one place where sex is salient is at birth.  Men cannot mother a child in
utero.  For those primarily concerned with degendering all notions of parenthood, a regime that
not only acknowledges but rewards women’s gestational labor may seem problematic.   On the
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other hand, for many, much of the law’s current refusal to acknowledge or reward women’s
gestational labor seems extraordinarily unjust.   As discussed, men simply cannot invest what
women must invest in pregnancy, and what women must invest is huge.  Rewarding that
investment with superior rights simply reflects a principle basic to the common law293 and to
more recent trends in family law: rewarding investment with rights.294   Refusing to honor what is
unquestionably a greater contribution smacks more of oppression than equality.295  Thus, the
reward that the proposed model offers to gestational mothers is not offered as a retreat from
ideals of gender equality, but as an embracing of those ideals.  Only if we recognize and reward
the labor that women have always done and, to a large extent, continue to do, can we expect a
world of meaningful equality.
The distinction between mothers and fathers proposed here builds on Martha Fineman’s 
suggestion to restructure the family relationship around the caretaking-based  parent-child dyad
instead of the sexually-based husband-wife dyad. By making the gestational mother-child
relationship primary, the proposed model gives significant parenting power to women.  It also,
like Fineman’s model, helps unmask dependencies that the sexual family model hides.   
Fineman, more than any other feminist or family scholar, has made us all realize how much
dependencies beget dependencies. By taking care of dependents, caretakers become dependent
because the person in need of care demands the time, resources and energy that the caretaker
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would otherwise use to take care of herself.296  The proposed model recognizes that women often
try to meet these dependencies by entering into relationships with others.  It recognizes that in
meeting those dependencies men must not be viewed simply as generous philanthropists, but as
individuals willingly undertaking obligations in return for benefits.  It forces men to take their
family obligations seriously because it holds them responsible only for those obligations that they
have willfully accepted.
Where this proposal differs from Fineman’s is in its ability to incorporate fathers and
reward them when they deserve it.  As I have argued elsewhere, a world in which women have all
the parental power and all the parental responsibility is not necessarily a feminist ideal.297  The
evidence suggests that the vast majority of  mothers want to share the rights and responsibilities
of parenthood with someone else.298  Women want someone with whom to share the physical,
financial and emotional burdens and they want someone with whom to share the joy.   For many
parents, it is simply more fun to parent together than apart.   In order to make it worthwhile to
men for them to share in the hard and the fun,  the law must be prepared to honor the sacrifices
they make and the desires they demonstrate to parent.  
By honoring those sacrifices and desires, the proposed model draws men into the family
unit, but in a much more rational and just fashion than does contemporary paternity law.  Instead
of relying on confused and inconsistent invocations of punishment and deterrence,  the proposed
model links parental status to a willful acceptance of parental responsibility.  Instead of assuming
that genetic contribution gives rise to moral responsibility, the proposed model assumes that
parental participation gives rise to moral responsibility.  Instead of assuming, without
explanation, that the child’s entitlement must be tied to the parent’s income, the proposed model
links the child’s entitlement to what the child and his or her primary caretaker have bargained for
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and come to rely on.  It also links parental obligation to parental rights in a way that can explain
why someone must continue to pay support even if he is not acting as a parent. He must continue
to pay because he agreed to pay.  By rooting parental status in contract, the proposed model
provides a unified understanding of where parental rights and obligations come from, while still
recognizing that different contracts will require different remedies.  It makes distinctions between
different kinds of fathers in order to make sense of legal fatherhood. 
As should be clear, also, by dispensing with biology as the nominal sin quo non of
fatherhood, we are not likely to be dispensing with the biparenting norm that paternity doctrine
currently reifies.  The great majority of children will have at least two parents because most
mothers share parental status at some point during a child’s life.299  Moreover, the two parents
they have will be individuals who chose parenthood, not individuals on whom the law imposed
parental status.   Some children may have mothers who chose not to parent with somebody else. 
Other children may have fathers who abandon them after a time.   The children in either of these
categories would, of course, find plenty of similarly situated friends among the children in our
current regime.   Today, the children of women who are not married and have not previously
agreed to share parental rights when they choose to buy sperm, have no fathers.  Comparably,
children of women who are not married and have not previously agreed to share parental rights
when they have sex often raise the child without a father and refuse to pursue the biological
father in paternity.  Other single women who want to parent and are tired of or uninterested in
waiting for marriage simply choose to adopt.300   There is little reason to believe the proposed
model will increase the number of children in these categories.301  As many children as have
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fathers today will likely have fathers under the new regime, but they will have fathers who
willingly assumed the role.302 
I consider the foregoing to be advantages of the proposed regime. Eliminating distinctions
that needlessly exclude deserving people from parental status while at the same time recognizing
that varying kinds of investment and commitment should give rise to proportional rights and
obligations are positive developments for the law of parenthood.  The proposed regime brings
disadvantages also, however, most notably the problem of cost. 
B. Disadvantages
The current system ensures that, except for children born to single women by virtue of
artificial insemination, there are always two potential sources of financial support for a child and
it mandates that each potential source pay a given percentage of his or her income. Thus, the
current system helps eschew state responsibility for children.   More single mothers may be in
need of financial help in the proposed regime because they will not be able to pursue the
biological father of the child for the full percentage of his income that the current regime makes
him responsible for paying to her.    This could be a considerable disadvantage. 
It also might not make much difference.  Most of the child support that gets paid, gets
paid voluntarily.303  Almost half of the of unwed women who could pursue the biological father
for paternity, choose not to.304  Those that do make paternity claims can usually base the claim on
relationship as well as blood.305  Moreover, regardless of the theory of their claims, most unwed
mothers have precious little to gain, even if their claims are successful.  The average unwed
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father earns just over $16,000 a year.306  Money spent on enforcement might be more efficiently
spent on a direct subsidy to children.  Also, of course, in the proposed regime, there would be
more money coming from a source that is now only tapped sporadically,  non-biological fathers
who have acted as fathers.  Thus, it is actually quite hard to estimate how much more a contract
regime would cost.  
Even if the proposed system did require greater governmental expenditure on children,
however, budgeting for those resources would do nothing more grave than bring the United
States up to par with the rest of the industrialized world.   The current scheme in this country,
which assumes bilateral obligation stemming from blood and assumes that two parents acting
alone should be able to meet all of the needs of children, is followed virtually nowhere else in the
world.  As mentioned earlier, with the exceptions of China and the United States, every
industrialized country has a family allowance program that provides regular cash payments to
families with children regardless of need.307   Some of these programs are employer based; others
are run completely by the government.308   Many of these countries also supplement the basic
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family allowance amount in single-parent households.309   In other words, most of the
industrialized world does not consider the dependency of youth a matter of private concern.310  If
the United States could sever its allegiance to privatizing the dependency of youth, the proposed
contractual framework would appear both less radical and less costly.  The fact is that there are
young dependents, just as there are old dependents, who need our collective help because taking
care of them is more than any one person can manage on his or her own.  Collective
responsibility for children should follow from the fact that children, like the elderly, are needy,
not from the fact that they are fatherless. 
There are any of a number of ways that the polity could meet this collective
responsibility.  First, of course, any extra money needed in light of an altered system of parental
status could come from general revenue.  Rhetorically, it is very easy for politicians to talk about
supporting children.  The proposed regime would give them a reason and a way to implement
that support.  Alternatively, some sort of payroll tax, not unlike the current FICA system, could
amply supply a family allowance program designed to give dependency assistance. Much greater
per child tax deductions, coupled with a program that adequately provided for children whose
parents were earning too little to take advantage of tax deductions, could also achieve the desired
goals.  
Moreover, as suggested earlier, if we are deeply concerned about the moral obligation or
deterrent functions that a biologically-based paternity system may serve, a tax on biological
fathers could serve those functions just as well while providing additional income for children.    
Again looking at the United States’ peer countries, most biological fathers pay something
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towards support of their children, but what they pay is a fraction of the subsidy that caretaker’s
receive.  The government assumes the primary responsibility for providing a minimum standard
of support.311   Moreover, these biological fathers usually have limited, if any, parental rights.312 
What this means is that men have less of a need to avoid detection (because they will not be
responsible for that much support) and mothers have less need to hide the biological father’s
identity (because he cannot meaningfully interfere with her parental rights).  These differences
may well account for the vastly different rates of paternity establishment in the United States and
its peer countries.    In most of the United States’ peer countries, the paternity establishment rate
for children of unmarried mothers hovers around 90%.313   In the United States, it is 30%.314   
Thus, perhaps ironically, making biological fatherhood significantly less important legally, may
make it easier to find and secure money from biological fathers.   
A tax on biological fathers would not provide all of the funding needed, but it could help
defray the cost. It would also not make men fathers in either the financial or the social sense
because fatherhood would come from relationship not blood.    Men would have status as fathers
not because women and children need support, but because the men have meaningfully
participated as family members. 
 
V. Conclusion
There is a great deal of discussion these days about both genetics and fatherhood.  On
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what seems like a daily basis, the biological sciences make new discoveries about the relevance
of biology in our lives.315  Comparably, the debate within the social sciences about the
importance of fathers in children’s lives rages on.316   There can be little doubt that both genes
and fathers (or, more precisely, two parent families) matter, but there are loads of reasons to
doubt that  a genetic father matters.  
This article has shown that the law has always been willing and at times eager to dismiss
the importance of the genetic connection.   It has dismissed the importance of that connection
most often when there is a different relevant connection, between the mother and another man, in
the child’s life.  It is increasingly dismissing the importance of genetic connection when genetics
are separated from sexual activity.  The advances in technology that allow us to learn more about
the role of genetics in our lives also make it possible to distill genetics from gestation, sexual
activity, and intent to be a parent.   The more these previously inseparable factors can be isolated,
the more the law must come to terms with how important each factor is to determining parental
status.   Intent to parent is emerging as the primary determinant of parental status.  Relaxed social
norms with regard to sexual behavior and parenting patterns are also forcing courts to confront
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equitable claims to parenthood when there is indisputably no genetic connection. Courts
receptivity to these claims turns largely on the extent to which the mother and father figure seem
to have manifested a mutual intent to parent. 
This trend away from genetics and towards contract is a positive development.  It is a
development that reconciles paternity precedent with technological advances, legal norms with
parenting practices and sexual mores with parental obligations.  It is a development that makes
every parent-child relationship a wanted parent-child relationship.   The science of genetics
increasingly tells us who we are. It need not tell us who our parents are.  
